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INTRODUCTION

Removal is the process by which the case originally filed by the
plaintiff in state court is transferred by the defendant or defendants to
federal court. Removal jurisdiction in the federal court may be based
* Briefing Attorney for Associate Justice David Peeples, Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Court of Appeals District of Texas. B.A., St. Lawrence University, J.D., Syracuse University
College of Law.
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on general diversity,' federal question grounds, 2 or on a number of
specific statutory grounds.' This article is limited to a discussion of
the removal of civil cases solely on diversity grounds.
The purpose of removal is "to secure a presumably unprejudiced
forum for one who has been brought unwillingly to the state court." 4
Legitimate reasons to seek removal to federal court may include
"closer judicial supervision and management of the case"; "more
favorable interpretations of substantive law"; different jury
demographics, size and unanimity requirements; "the opportunity to
transfer to another [judicial] district"; different evidentiary rules; and
different rules on the awarding of attorney fees.'
Removal is an important and useful tool when it is employed for its
proper purpose. Unfortunately, it is a procedure which is often
abused, either through ignorance or as a result of improper litigation
tactics. Because removal is automatic,6 compliance with the statutory
procedures will effect a removal even when no right to remove exists.
This can cause severe disruption in the state court where the case has
been proceeding, as well as an intolerable waste of time, money and
other resources.
The issue of disruption of state proceedings has concerned many
courts. An Oregon court of appeals summarized the frustration with
this quotation from a federal judge:
There's something wrong with a procedure that allows a party to
simply walk out on a Judge and remove to another Court. The State
Court would be put in an impossible position if this were the rule. The
procedure would allow any party to force a continuance even after a
denial by a trial Judge by simply filing the removal petition. In this
City, where the Courthouses are only two blocks apart, it would be even

1. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982).
2. Id. § 1441(a).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1982)(removal by federal officers); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1442a
(1982)(removal by members of the armed forces); 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1982)(removal of civil
rights cases); 28 U.S.C. § 1444 (1982)(removal of foreclosure actions against the United
States).
4. Marketing Showcase, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 445 F. Supp. 755, 760 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
5. See Fousekis & Brelsford, Removal, 11 LITIGATION 39 (1985)(listing legitmate reasons
for seeking removal). Fousekis and Brelsford also cite a preference for federal judges as a
reason for removal, but with some reservations as to its legitimacy. See id.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 103-106.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 103-106.
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easier. And remember that the removal petition can be filed and the
Court ousted of his power to proceed whether or not there's any merit
in the removal petition.
I'm just positive that the framers of this rule did not intend for it to
act in this way ...

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit expressed similar
sentiments:
We are concerned that this construction of section 1446 makes it susceptible to substantial abuse by individuals seeking to interrupt or delay
state trials... [T]he conclusion that subsequent proceedings in the state
court, before remand, are absolutely void creates a great potential for
disruption of judicial proceedings in the state courts. It permits one
wishing to delay a state trial to do so, even though his removal petition
is subsequently found to be frivolous. It is a situation which deserves
congressional attention, for that kind of disruption of state court proceedings seems wholly unnecessary and unwarranted. 9

Despite this sympathy with the plight of the state courts, the federal courts have been unable or unwilling to ameliorate the situation.
Some, like the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in South Carolina v. Moore, see the problem as one for congressional attention.' 0
Others simply seem to believe that the problem is one with which the
state courts alone must wrestle. For example, after acknowledging
the "potential havoc" of removal during trial and noting that such
removal can be accomplished "regardless of the actual merits of the
petition for removal," one federal district court stated that "[t]he
Court cannot here be concerned with the effect the attachment of federal jurisdiction had on the subsequent state court proceedings and
jury verdict . . . The state court will have to grapple with this

problem."' 1

8. Ramahi v. Hobart Corp., 615 P.2d 348, 351-52 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
9. South Carolina v. Moore, 447 F.2d 1067, 1074 (4th Cir. 1971). In Moore, the court
held that state court action between removal and remand is void. Id.
10. Id. Because of the longstanding and uniform construction of the removal statutes, as
discussed infra, the court is probably correct in asserting that reform must come from the
legislature rather than the courts.
11. First Nat'l Bank in Little Rock v. Johnson & Johnson, 455 F. Supp. 361, 363 (E.D.
Ark. 1978). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has also been willing to let the burden
fall on the state courts. In Butler v. King, the court expressed dismay at the abuse of the
system caused by meritless last-minute removal but implied that it was no great concern because a "brief recess and a short ride to the federal courthouse ... undoubtedly would have
resulted in quick and successful consideration of a motion to remand." 781 F.2d 486, 489-90
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This article will address the problem of abuse of the removal statutes and the difficulties caused by the automatic nature of removal
combined with the forced stay on state court proceedings. In order to
illustrate this problem, the article will focus on the case of Brentwood
FinancialCorp. v. Lamprecht,' 2 which involves the misuse of removal
during the state court trial. If the attempted removal had been successful, a mistrial would have resulted and defendants would have
been afforded a preview of plaintiff's case and a second opportunity to
prepare a defense. 3 After examining the problems created by the language and construction of the present removal laws, the article will
present several alternative solutions. These include application of removal law as amended in 1988, a return to pre-1948 construction of
the effect of removal on state court jurisdiction, imposition of existing
sanctions, application to civil cases of portions of the law for removal
of criminal cases, and a statutory amendment proposed by the American Law Institute.
II.

FACTS OF BRENTWOOD FINANCIAL CORP. v. LAMPRECHT

On the night of December 31, 1984, the Chateau Orleans Apartments in San Antonio, Texas were rocked by an explosion.' 4 One
tenant was killed and several others suffered personal injury and/or
property loss. Among the injured was Heidi Lamprecht, who was
thrown from her bed in her second floor apartment into the parking
(5th Cir. 1986). The court did not consider the disorder that even a brief recess can cause or
the lack of respect such an attitude displays towards the state court. Id. Furthermore, no
consideration was given to the fact that a "short ride to the federal courthouse" and a quick
resolution of the removal issue is not always possible. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has acknowledged this concern with the following language, but it has not offered a

solution to the problem:
The problem is not acute if the state court is sitting where a federal judge is readily available, the removal petition is promptly brought to his attention, he recognizes it as an
attempt to delay or disrupt the state court proceedings and promptly files a remand order.
State courts, however, sit in many places in which federal judges are not readily available
or are not always so. In such situations, the present statute . . . does permit a party
seeking to do so to seriously delay and disrupt state court proceedings by filing a removal
petition, though the removal claim, itself, be frivolous.
Moore, 447 F.2d at 1074 n.23.
12. 736 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
13. The author was involved in the appeal of the Lamprecht case on behalf of the plaintiff.
However, the author disclaims any personal knowledge that the defense attorneys involved in
the Lamprecht case purposefully abused the removal statutes as part of their defense strategy.
14. Brentwood Fin. Corp. v. Lamprecht, 736 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Tex. App.-San Antonio

1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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lot below. 5 She sustained severe physical injury as well as psychological trauma. 6 On January 7, 1985, Ms. Lamprecht filed a personal
injury suit in Texas state court' 7 naming the managing entity of the
apartment complex, Brentwood Financial Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as "Brentwood"), as the sole defendant.' 8 At the time of
this filing, plaintiff Lamprecht was a citizen of Texas and defendant
Brentwood was a citizen of California.' 9 Brentwood filed its Original
Answer on January 29, 1985,20 but made no attempt to remove the
case at that time. Some six months later, on July 29, 1985, Ms. Lamprecht filed her Second Amended Original Petition naming Chateau
Orleans, Ltd., the owner of the apartment complex, as a party defendant. 2 ' Chateau Orleans, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Chateau Orleans") was a citizen of California at the time of this filing.2 2 Two
general partners of Chateau Orleans, both citizens of California, were
also named as defendants but the lawsuit was not pursued against
them at the time of trial. None of these defendants attempted to remove the case to federal court. By subsequent amendment on September 11, 1985, plaintiff named the City of San Antonio and City
Public Service of the City of San Antonio (hereinafter referred to as
"the City" and "CPS," respectively) as defendants.2" Both were citizens of Texas for diversity purposes.2 4
The trial of this cause commenced in the 166th Judicial District

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Plaintiff's Original Petition at 1, Lamprecht v. Brentwood Fin. Corp. (Tex. Dist. Ct.
Jan. 21, 1986) (No. 85CI-00243). The original lawsuit was brought on behalf of several plaintiffs, all citizens of Texas. Id. By the time of trial only Ms. Lamprecht remained as a plaintiff.
Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Original Petition at 1, Lamprecht (No. 85CI-00243).
18. Plaintiff's Original Petition at 1, Lamprecht (No. 85CI-00243). Plaintiff's petition
alleged that the apartment explosion was caused by a natural gas leak and that Brentwood, as
managing entity, should have discovered the leak before the explosion occurred. Id. at 2-3.
19. Plaintiff's Original Petition at 1, Lamprecht v. Brentwood Fin. Corp. (Tex. Dist. Ct.
Jan. 21, 1986) (No. 85CI-00243). Brentwood was a California corporation with its principle
place of business in California. Id.
20. Defendant's Original Answer at 1, Lamprecht (No. 85CI-00243). Brentwood's answer
consisted of a general denial and assertions of sole proximate cause and unavoidable accident.

Id.
21. Plaintiff's Second Amended Original Petition at 1, Lamprecht (No. 85CI-00243).
22. Id. Chateau Orleans was a limited partnership with its principle place of business in
California. Id.
23. Plaintiffs' Third Amended Original Petition at 1, Lamprecht v. Brentwood Fin. Corp.
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 1986) (No. 85CI-00243).
24. Id.
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Court of Bexar County, Texas on January 13, 1986. A jury was selected and plaintiff began to present her case. On January 15, 1986, at
approximately 2:00 p.m., plaintiff rested her case. 25 At this time
counsel for defendants Chateau Orleans and Brentwood approached
the bench and orally moved that the City and CPS be dismissed as
defendants on the ground that no evidence of negligence had been
introduced against them.26 Counsel for plaintiff opposed the motion
and stated that evidence had been introduced showing that overpressurization of natural gas lines may have caused the explosion. 27 The
judge orally granted the motion to dismiss and pandemonium ensued.28 Counsel for Brentwood and Chateau Orleans handed the
judge a copy of a document entitled "Notice of Removal," stated that
the petition was "on file,"' 29 that the action was now removed to federal court, and that the state court had no further jurisdiction.3" The
record does not indicate that defendants filed a copy of the petition
for removal with the clerk of the state court, or even that such a copy
was handed to the state judge on the bench. The judge immediately
reversed his ruling on the motion to dismiss the City and CPS on the
ground that counsel who had made the motion did not represent
those parties and had no authority to present the motion on their behalf.3 ' During the dispute that followed, counsel for plaintiff suggested that a brief recess be taken and that the judge sequester the
jury while a remand was sought.3 2 The judge informed everyone that
he intended to proceed to judgment.3 3 Nevertheless, counsel for
Brentwood and Chateau Orleans, as well as their designated corporate representatives, packed their belongings and walked out of the
25. Statement of Facts at 545, Lamprecht (No. 85CI-00243).
26. Id. The jury had been excused from the courtroom and was not present during the
making of this motion or the exchange which followed.

27. Id. at 546.
28. Id.
29. Statement of Facts at 546-47, Lamprecht v. Brentwood Fin. Corp. (No. 85CI-00243).

It is not clear from the record whether counsel meant that the petition was on file in the federal
court or the state court. While there is no indication in the record that the petition had been
filed with the state court at this time, or that it was ever filed with the state court, counsel had
filed a removal petition in the federal court two hours earlier. It appears, therefore, that this
federal petition is the one to which he referred when he informed the state court judge that the
petition was "on file."
30. Id.
31. Id. at 546.
32. Id. at 547.
33. Statement of Facts at 547, Lamprecht (No. 85CI-00243).
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courtroom as the judge admonished them from the bench not to
leave. 3

Brentwood and Chateau Orleans filed their verified petition for removal and accompanying bond with the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division at approximately 12:00 on January 15, 1986. 3 ' The petition alleged that diversity of citizenship existed by virtue of plaintiff having "abandoned her
claim" against the resident defendants.36 The petition further alleged
that it was filed "immediately after the Plaintiff rested" her case,37
although it was in fact filed some two hours prior to the time plaintiff
rested. Defendants specifically alleged that written notice of the filing
of the petition had been given to all adverse parties, but no mention
was made of a copy of the petition having been filed with the state
court.3 8

At approximately 4:00 p.m. that same afternoon the state court
judge received a telephone call from a judge of the federal court.39
The federal judge stated that he had reviewed the removal petition
and had found it defective on its face for a variety of reasons.' He
notified the state judge that the case was remanded and that the state
court was free to proceed.' On January 17, 1986, the federal court
memorialized its oral order of remand with a written memorandum

34. See id. at 575-76 (court explains sequence of events for record). For a similar sequence of events, see Ramahi v. Hobart Corp., 615 P.2d 348, 351 (Or. Ct. App. 1980)(defendant filed "Notice of Filing Petition for Removal", and counsel and representatives left
courtroom).
35. Memorandum Opinion and Order Nunc Pro Tunc at 3, Lamprecht v. Brentwood Fin.
Corp. (W.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 1986) (No. SA-86-CA-126).
36. Id. at 3-4.
37. Id.
38. Petition for Removal at 4, Lamprecht (No. SA-86-CA-126).
39. Statement of Facts at 580, Lamprecht (No. 85CI-00243).
40. Among the reasons articulated in the federal court's subsequent written order was
failure to demonstrate total diversity of citizenship. Memorandum Opinion and Order Nunc
Pro Tunc at 3, Lamprecht v. Brentwood Fin. Corp., (W.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 1986) (No. SA-86CA-126). The removal petition was filed in federal court two hours before plaintiff had rested,
yet it asserted that at the time of filing plaintiff had rested her case and had abandoned her
claim against the resident defendants. Id. Because of the error of this assertion, the resident
defendants were still parties to the suit at the time the removal petition was filed and diversity
of citizenship was lacking. Id. Therefore, the district court judge's telephone notification of
his remand order to the state court judge entitled the state court to proceed to judgment. Id. at
5-6.
41. Statement of Facts at 580, Lamprecht (No. 85CI-00243).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University,

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 21 [], No. 1, Art. 5

ST. MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:59

opinion and order nunc pro tunc remanding the case to state court.42
As stated by the federal court, "[t]he purpose of this order [was] to
articulate to the parties the reasons for the summary order of remand
of January 15, 1986."1 3 A certified copy of this order was filed in the
state court on January 23, 1986.44 In the meantime, the state court
trial had resumed on January 15, 1986, without the presence of counsel or corporate representatives for Brentwood or Chateau Orleans.
The City and CPS presented their case in the form of a stipulation
read into the record, the court delivered instructions to the jury, and
plaintiff and defendants City and CPS delivered their closing arguments.4 5 On January 16, 1986, the jury returned its verdict in favor of
plaintiff against defendants Brentwood and Chateau Orleans in the
amount of 2.7 million dollars.46 The jury did not find that defendants
City and CPS were negligent. Judgment upon the verdict was entered
7
on January 21, 1986.1
Brentwood and Chateau Orleans filed a Motion for New Trial
which was heard on April 7, 1986, but the trial court denied the motion.4" They then filed an appeal with the Fourth Court of Appeals in
San Antonio. Of various points raised on appeal, two points addressed the circumstances of defendants' purported removal. One
point raised the issue of the propriety of the trial court proceeding to
verdict at a time when the defendants alleged that the federal court
had exclusive jurisdiction. Additional points of error questioned the
propriety of proceeding with the trial after defendants had left the
courtroom without giving defendants notice that the case would
proceed.49
The Court of Appeals found that it did not appear from the record

42. Memorandum Opinion and Order Nunc Pro Tunc at 1, Lamprecht (No. SA-86-CA126).
43. Id. at 2.
44. Id. at 5.
45. The record on appeal indicates that some of this activity took place before the federal
court notified the state court that the removal was improper. The validity of this interim
action is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 136-162.
46. Statement of Facts at 577-78, Lamprecht v. Brentwood Fin. Corp. (No. 85CI-00243).
The jury found the amount of actual damages to be $222,000. Id. Punitive damages were
assessed against Brentwood in the sum of $1.5 million and against Chateau Orleans in the sum
of $1 million. Id.
47. Judgment at 4, Lamprecht (Jan. 21, 1986) (No. 85CI-00243).
48. Statement of Facts at 592-635, Lamprecht (Tex. Dist. Ct. Apr. 7, 1986) (No. 85CI00243).
49. Appellants' Brief at 30, Brentwood Fin. Corp. v. Lamprecht, 736 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.
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that the removal process was completed or the removal effected because "the record does not in any way indicate that appellants gave
the trial court or the clerk of the state district court a copy of the
removal petition."5 0 Because Defendants did not show that the removal was effected, the state court did not lose jurisdiction and the
judgment of the state court was affirmed. 5 Defendants next sought
redress in the Texas Supreme Court,5 2 but their application for writ of
error was refused with the notation "no reversible error."
App.-San Antonio 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(No. 4-86-00240). The actual wording of the points
of error raised by defendants is as follows:
POINT OF ERROR NO. 6: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RECONVENED THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS AT A TIME WHEN THE FEDERAL
COURT
RETAINED
EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION
OVER
THOSE
PROCEEDINGS.
POINT OF ERROR NO. 7: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY RE-CONVENING THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS THAT LED TO A VERDICT ADVERSE TO APPELLANTS WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO NOTIFY
APPELLANTS' COUNSEL OF THOSE PROCEEDINGS, AND COMPOUNDED
THAT ERROR BY REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL ONCE APPELLANTS'
COUNSEL AHD (sic) BROUGHT THE ERROR TO THE TRIAL COURT'S
ATTENTION.
1. A Brief Review of the Relevant Facts
2. The Trial Court's Failure to Give Appellants Any Notice of the Resumption of Trial
Proceedings Represents a Violation of Appellants' Federal and State Due Process Rights,
and Therefore Constitutes the Commission of Reversible Error.
Id. at 27, 30-31.
The remainder of defendants' points of error raised procedural issues, no evidence, and insufficient evidence claims which are not relevent to this discussion. Id. at Table of Contents of
Appellant's Brief.
50. Brentwood Fin. Corp. v. Lamprecht, 736 S.W.2d 836, 844 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
51. Id. at 845. The effect of defendants' apparent failure to file a copy with the state court
is discussed in detail below. The Court of Appeals also found that because the case was not
effectively removed "[a]ny error concerning the court's proceeding without appellants is totally
due to appellants' action in voluntarily leaving the courtroom." Id.
Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Rubin provides support for the Lamprecht court's
decision. 238 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971). In Rubin, the appellate record did not contain the petition for removal nor did it appear that a written notice was
given to the adverse parties or a copy of the petition was filed with the clerk of the state court.
Id. at 286. The Florida court held that the burden rested on the removing party to show by
the record when the removal was effected. Id. Because this was not done, the court held that
the state court had not lost jurisdiction and its actions were valid. Id.
52. Defendants' points of error (relevent to the discussion herein) in their application for
writ of error read as follows:
POINT OF ERROR IV: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE RECORD BEFORE THE COURT WAS INADEQUATE TO ALLOW THE
COURT TO PASS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES PRESENTED BY PETITIONERS' REMOVAL OF THIS CASE.
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REMOVAL LAW IN EFFECT AT TIME OF LAMPRECHT

Caveat

The following discussion sets forth the removal law as it existed in
1986, at the time Lamprecht was removed, and until November 19,
1988. On that date the removal laws were amended by the Judicial
Improvements Act.53 The 1988 amendment is not extensive and most
of the statutory provisions discussed below are still in effect. Any
changes made by the amendment in the statutes discussed below are
noted in footnotes and are presented in more detail in the text in a
section specifically addressing the amendment.
B.

Strict Construction

The right to remove a case from state to federal court is a right
solely conferred by statute. 4 Construction of the removal statutes is a
matter of federal law.5 5 The federal courts uniformly hold that these
statutes are to be strictly construed against removal56 in order to "prevent encroachment on the state court's right to decide cases properly
brought before it." 57 Strict construction is particularly important in
cases removed on diversity grounds.58
The burden rests on the defendant to show that removal is proper. 9
This burden includes establishing not only the jurisdictional basis for
POINT OF ERROR V: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO ORDER SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE TRANSCRIPT.
POINT OF ERROR VI: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
HOLD THAT THE RESUMPTION OF PROCEEDINGS AFTER PETITIONERS'
REMOVAL OF THE CASE VIOLATED PETITIONERS' STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
Petitioners' Application for Writ of Error at 19-22, Brentwood Fin. Corp. v. Lamprecht
(Tex. Jan. 20, 1988) (No. C-6978).
53. Judicial Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4669 (1988).
54. Gould v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York, 790 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986); McCurtain County Prod. Corp. v. Cowett, 482 F. Supp. 809, 812
(E.D. Okla. 1978).
55. Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 19.86).
56. E.g., Brown, 792 F.2d at 482; Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062,
1064 (9th Cir. 1979); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Brown, 535 F. Supp. 486, 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982).
57. Harris v. Huffco Petroleum Corp., 633 F. Supp. 250, 253 (S.D. Ala. 1986).
58. Id.

59. Abels v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985); Harris v.
Huffco Petroleum Corp., 633 F. Supp. 250, 253 (S.D. Ala. 1986); Gorman v. Abbott Laboratories, 629 F. Supp. 1196, 1203 (D.R.I. 1986).
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removal, but also compliance with the statutory procedures. 60 In
Lamprecht, defendants Brentwood and Chateau Orleans failed to
meet this burden for reasons that are discussed below.
C. Requirements of Removal in a Civil Case
The general removal statute, section 1441 of title 28, provides that:
[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or
the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district
61
and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
"Diversity actions are removable only if none of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
which [the] action is brought. '6 2 Diversity of citizenship for removal
purposes is determined by examining plaintiff's pleadings. 63 Complete diversity must exist both at the time the case is filed and at the
time of removal,' unless some voluntary act by plaintiff creates diversity where none existed from the face of the original complaint. 65 The
citizenship of purely nominal parties is not, however, to be considered
in determining the existence of diversity jurisdiction or the presence of
66
a resident defendant.
The remainder of section 1441 addresses specific removal issues
such as the removal of separate and independent claims. 67 These is-

60. Albonetti v. GAF Corp.-Chem. Group, 520 F. Supp. 825, 827 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982). This section has recently been amended. See infra text
accompanying notes 219-225.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982). Section 1441(b) makes it clear that this requirement does
not apply to the removal of cases based on federal question jurisdiction. See id. (claims
founded on federal question jurisdiction are "removable regardless of the citizenship or residence of the parties").
63. Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 790 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986); Self v. General Motors Corp., 588 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 1978).
64. Strasser v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 631 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (C.D. Cal. 1986);
New England Explosives Corp. v. Maine Ledge Blasting Specialist, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 1343,
1347 (D. Me. 1982); Kerstetter v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 496 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
65. Gould, 790 F.2d at 773; see also discussion of voluntary-involuntary rule infra text
accompanying notes 88-102.
66. Abels v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3rd Cir. 1985). The legislature has recently enacted a provision expressly authorizing the courts to disregard the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names. See infra text accompanying note 219.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982). The remainder of section 1441 provides:
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sues are beyond the scope of this article.
When plaintiff filed her original petition in Lamprecht, complete
diversity existed between the parties because the sole named defendant was not a citizen of the State of Texas.6 The case was thus removable at that time. At the time that defendants actually attempted
to remove the case, though, complete diversity was lacking and two
named defendants were citizens of the forum state.6 9 No voluntary
act of the plaintiff created diversity; ° therefore, the case failed to meet
the basic criterion of federal removal jurisdiction. 71
D.

How Removal Is Effected

A civil action is removed by filing a verified petition 2 with the federal district court "for the district and division within which such action is pending. 7 3 This petition must contain a short and plain
statement of facts showing that the removing party is entitled to remove the case.74 Copies of "all process, pleadings and orders" served
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or
causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all
issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
(d) Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state as defined in section
1603(a) of this title may be removed by the foreign state to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
Upon removal the action shall be tried by the court without a jury. Where removal is
based upon this subsection, the time limitations of section 1446(b) of this chapter may be
enlarged at any time for cause shown.
(e) The court to which such civil action is removed is not precluded from hearing and
determining any claim in such civil action because the State court from which such civil
action is removed did not have jurisdiction over that claim.
Id.
68. Plaintiff's Original Petition at 1, Lamprecht v. Brentwood Fin. Corp. (Tex. Dist. Ct.
Jan. 21, 1986) (No. 85CI-00243). At this point in time the only defendant was Brentwood, a
citizen of California. Id.
69. Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Original Petition at 1, Lamprecht (No. 85CI-00243) (plaintiff's final petition). The defendants in the case at this time included the City of San Antonio
and City Public Service of the City of San Antonio, both citizens of Texas. Id.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 88-102.
71. Memorandum and Order Nunc Pro Tunc at 1-5, Lamprecht v. Brentwood Fin. Corp.
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 1988) (No. SA-86-CA126).
72. Because of recent statutory amendments, a verified petition is no longer required. See
discussion of amendment of November 19, 1988, infra pp. 93-94.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (1982).
74. Id. This language also applies to the "notice of removal" called for by section 1446 as
amended. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(a) (West Supp. 1989).
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upon the removing party must accompany this petition. 75 The petition must also include a bond of sufficient amount to cover the costs
of the removal proceedings in the event that the case could not be
removed or was improperly removed. 7 6 Although it is not explicitly
stated in the statute, it has been held that "all defendants, except
purely nominal parties, who have been served and who may properly
join in a removal petition, must so join in order to effect the removal."' 77 Thus, if one defendant is prevented from removing a case
(i.e. he is a citizen of the state in which the case is filed and the federal
removal jurisdiction is based on diversity), his fellow non-resident defendants are also prevented from removing the case.
If a defendant wishes to take advantage of the removal statute, the
petition for removal must be filed within thirty days after defendant
receives "a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief
upon which [the] action or proceeding is based."' 7 The thirty-day
requirement is designed to minimize delay and wasted resources by
preventing a defendant from waiting to see how the case progresses
and then starting over in federal court after substantial proceedings
have taken place in the state court. 79 This time limit is not jurisdictional, yet it is to be strictly applied.8 0 A defendant may find that he
has waived his right to remove by failing to exercise it in a timely
fashion or by invoking the processes of the state court.8 ' He cannot

75. Id.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (1982). A bond is not required if the removal petition is filed on
behalf of the United States. Id. The general bond requirement has been deleted from the
statute by amendment dated November 19, 1988. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(d) (West Supp. 1989);
see also discussion of amendment of November 19, 1988, infra p. 93.
77. Friedrich v. Whittaker Corp., 467 F. Supp. 1012, 1013 (S.D. Tex. 1979); see also
Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1986); McCurtain County Prod. Corp. v.
Cowett, 482 F. Supp. 809, 812 (E.D. Okla. 1978).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1982). This section also provides an alternative method of computing the thirty-day filing deadline. The defendant may be allowed to file "within thirty days
after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in
court and is not required to be served on the defendant ...." Id. Defendant must file his
removal petition within the shorter of the alternative periods of time. Id.
79. Gorman v. Abbott Laboratories, 629 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D.R.I. 1986).
80. Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 169 U.S. 92, 98 (1898)(time requirement is
not jurisdictional but is "modal and formal" and may be waived); Brown, 792 F.2d at 481
(failure to file removal petition within thirty day period "may render the removal improvident" and result in remand); Albonetti v. GAF Corp.-Chem. Group, 520 F. Supp. at 825,
827 (S.D. Tex. 1981)(neither stipulation by parties nor court order can extend time period).
81. Brown, 792 F.2d at 481; Aynesworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 604 F. Supp. 630, 637
(W.D. Tex. 1985); Gore v. Stenson, 616 F. Supp. 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 1984). One court has
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"experiment on his case in the state court, and, upon an adverse deci82
sion, then transfer it to the Federal court.Because all defendants must join in a removal petition, the thirtyday time period effectively runs from the time the first defendant receives a pleading or other paper showing the action is removable. 3
Subsequently served defendants must then join the petition or consent
to the removal within thirty days of service upon them. 4 If the first
defendant served does not remove the case within thirty days, he has
waived his right to remove and later cannot join a removal petition
sought to be filed by subsequently added defendants.85 The subsequent defendants cannot remove the case even if they file their petition within thirty days of service upon them because unanimity is
lacking due to the first defendant's inability to join.8 6 Thus, by failing
to timely file a petition for removal, one defendant may effectively
waive the right of removal for all defendants, even those who were not
party to the suit at the time the "waiver" occurred. 7

held that a delay of fifteen minutes in announcing an intent to remove constitutes waiver of the
right to remove. Walker v. American Telephone & Telegraph, 684 F. Supp. 475, 478 (S.D.
Tex. 1988). Walker involved a case which was not originally removable, but became removable during trial when the resident defendant reached a settlement with plaintiff and was dismissed from the action. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 88-102 (discussion of cases
becoming removable). The resident defendant was dismissed during a settlement conference at
approximately 1:15 p.m. The nonresident defendants gave notice that they intended to remove
the case at 1:30 p.m. The court noted that "where the right to remove occurs immediately
before, at, or during trial, the diverse defendant must exercise his right to remove without
delay." Walker, 684 F. Supp. at 477. The court then concluded that "without delay" means
"immediately" and that even a fifteen minute delay is too long. Failure to give immediate
notification of an intent to remove results in waiver of the right to remove. Id.
82. Aynesworth, 604 F. Supp. at 637 (quoting Rosenthal v. Coates, 148 U.S. 142 (1893)).
83. Friedrich v. Whittacker Corp., 467 F. Supp. 1012, 1014 (S.D. Tex. 1979). Contra
Adams v. Lederle Laboratories, 569 F. Supp. 234, 243 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
84. Adams, 569 F. Supp. at 243.
85. Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1986); Gorman v. Abbott Laboratories 629 F. Supp. 1196, 1201-02 (D.R.I. 1986); Friedrich, 467 F. Supp. at 1014.
86. See Brown, 792 F.2d at 481(case removable when filed, defendant added four years
later cannot remove); Gorman, 629 F. Supp. at 1199 (first defendant did not remove, so lateradded defendants could not remove).
87. One court has recently repudiated this effect of the "rule of unanimity." See Garside
v. Osco Drug, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 19, 22 (D. Mass. 1988)(case removable by defendant despite
ability of co-defendants to remove four years prior). In Garside, the defendant removed within
thirty days of service upon him, but four years after other defendants had waived their right to
remove. Id. In an unusual twist, the removing defendant then sought to remand the case on
the ground that the removal was not timely. Plaintiff opposed the remand. Id. at 20. The
court acknowledged that published opinions supported the view that the subsequently added
defendant was barred from removing because the other defendants could not join the removal,
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If a case as originally stated is not removable, the thirty-day time
period for filing the removal petition begins to run upon defendant's
receipt of "a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other
paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which
is or has become removable. '88 Most commonly, cases become removable after the dismissal of a defendant whose presence in the case
prevented removal, 9 so long as the dismissal is voluntary on the part
of the plaintiff. 90 It is generally accepted that this "voluntary-involuntary" test of removability survived the 1948 revision and 1949
amendment of the removal statutes. 9 1
Ordinarily, diversity is measured both at the time the suit is filed
and at the time the removal petition is filed, but if the plaintiff voluntarily drops a nondiverse defendant then the court may look only to
the time of removal to determine diversity. 92 The dismissal may be

but found itself free to disagree because there was no First Circuit case on point. The court
relied primarily on commentary by Wright and Moore and held that "a subsequently served
defendant has thirty days to seek removal, even though its co-defendants may be time-barred
from doing so." Id. at 21-22; see also 14A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3731, at 504-08 (2d ed. 1985).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1982). It is important to note that a defendant desiring to remove must seize the first opportunity and file for removal within 30 days of the first pleading
establishing federal jurisdiction. Hubbard v. Union Oil of California, 601 F. Supp. 790, 795
(S.D.W. Va. 1985). If a defendant waives the first opportunity to remove, he cannot remove
when successive grounds arise. Id. Subsequent events will not make a case "more removable"
or "again removable" if it was originally removable. Id. By recent amendment, a one year
time limit is now applied to removal of cases which are not originally removable but later
become removable. See infra text accompanying notes 219-225.
89. This is commonly a defendant who is a citizen of the same state as the plaintiff or is a
citizen of the forum state.
90. Whitcomb v. Smithson, 175 U.S. 635, 637-38 (1900)(directed verdict); Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 790 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1986)(summary judgment), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 987 (summary judgment); In re Iowa Mfg. Co. of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 747
F.2d 462, 463 (8th Cir. 1984)(voluntary-involuntary rule is bright line test of removability);
Weems v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 380 F.2d 545, 547-49 (5th Cir. 1967) (directed verdict).
91. In re Iowa, 747 F.2d at 464; Self v. General Motors Corp., 588 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir.
1978); Weems, 380 F.2d at 548. The purpose of the voluntary-involuntary rule was to prevent
premature removals where the issue of the dismissal of the resident defendant, against plaintiff's wishes, had not been finally determined by the state court because plaintiff still had a
right to appeal from the adverse ruling. Weems, 380 F.2d at 546; Saylor v. General Motors
Corp., 416 F. Supp. 1173, 1175 (E.D. Ky. 1976). The question has now been raised whether
the voluntary-involuntary rule should continue to apply once the time for filing a state appeal
has passed or once all avenues of appeal have been exhausted. Self, 588 F.2d at 658; Strassey
v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 631 F. Supp. 1254, 1256-58 (C.D. Cal. 1986). This issue is
beyond the scope of this paper.
92. Aynesworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 604 F. Supp. 630, 633 (W.D. Tex. 1985); New
England Explosives Corp. v. Maine Ledge Blasting Specialist, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 1343, 1347
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formal, such as by written motion or amended pleadings, or it may be
found in plaintiff's words or actions at trial.9 3 In Heniford v. American Motors Sales Corp.,9 the plaintiff specifically told the jury not to
return a verdict against the resident defendant and, in effect, dismissed his claim against that defendant. 95 The court held that such a
voluntary, express abandonment of claims against the resident defendant rendered the action removable. 96 Because the resident defendant had not been formally dismissed from the case, the court
realigned that defendant with the plaintiff for purposes of determining
diversity. 9
In contrast, the plaintiff in Aynesworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp.98

urged the jury in summation to find against the nonresident defendant, but did not address the cause of action against the resident defendants. 99 This left open the alternative of finding against the
resident defendants even though plaintiff did not specifically request
such relief in summation. The court found that this conduct did not
constitute an express, voluntary abandonment of plaintiff's claim
against the resident defendants and that the action had not become
removable. 100

As a final example, in Cudney v. Mid-Continent Airlines,'0 ' the
court dismissed the resident defendant at the close of plaintiff's case
on the ground that plaintiff had made no effort to prove his case
(D. Me. 1982); Heniford v. American Motors Sales Corp., 471 F. Supp. 328, 334 (D.S.C.
1979).
93. It is interesting to note that while the language of section 1446(b) governing cases
which were not originally removable refers to receipt of an "amended pleading, motion, order
or other paper," the courts have read this provision as not requiring a written pleading to
create the right to remove. Aynesworth, 604 F. Supp. at 637.
94. 471 F. Supp. 328 (D.S.C. 1979).
95. Id. at 332. The chronology of events in Heniford was as follows: On February 1,
1979, plaintiff delivered his closing argument to the jury, during which he asked the jury not to
find against the sole resident defendant. Id. at 331-32. On February 2, 1979, the remaining
defendant announced that he was removing the case to federal court. At 3:12 p.m., on that
day, the jury retired to deliberate. At 4:25 p.m., the petition for removal was filed in the
federal court. At 5:00 p.m., a copy of the petition was delivered to the state court and notice
was given to plaintiff. At 6:10 p.m., the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff against the
nonresident defendant. Id.
96. Id. at 334-35.
97. Id. at 333.
98. Aynesworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 604 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Tex. 1985).
99. Id. at 635-36.
100. Id. at 636-37.
101. 98 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Mo. 1951).
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against the resident defendant at trial. The nonresident defendant
then sought to remove the action. The court held that the action was
not removable because the dismissal of the resident defendant was involuntary and plaintiff had a right to appeal from that dismissal. 0 2
The final steps in the removal process concern giving notice to the
state court and opposing parties. "Promptly after the filing of [the
removal] petition and bond the defendant or defendants shall give
written notice thereof to all adverse parties and shall file a copy of the
petition with the clerk of [the] State court."1 °3 This sequence of
events effects the removal.' °4 If the procedures set forth in the removal statute are followed properly, then the removal occurs automatically and no order granting the removal is required.'0 5 Once the
statutory steps are completed, the case falls solely under the jurisdiction of the federal court and "the State court shall proceed no further
unless and until the case is remanded." 10 6 It is the automatic nature
of removal combined with this language barring further state court
action which is the crux of the problem addressed by this article.
Moreover, even if the right of removal is being abused, if the case is
not removable and if removal is being sought merely as a means to
force a mistrial in the state court, that court is stripped of any power
to prevent the abuse so long as statutory procedures are followed by
the removing party.
The requirement of filing a copy of the petition with the clerk of the
state court has been the subject of numerous court opinions and has
also been the victim of considerable erosion. It has been labelled a
"procedural and ministerial act" which simply informs the state court
not to proceed further. 0 7 One court has held that handing a copy of
the removal petition to the state court judge in open court is sufficient
compliance with this requirement.1' s The Court of Appeals for the

102. Cudney v. Mid-Continent Airlines, 98 F. Supp. 430, 405 (E.D. Mo. 1951).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1982).
104. Id.
105. Okot v. Callahan, 788 F.2d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 1986); Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy
Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e).
107. Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 434 F.
Supp. 1053, 1055 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
108. Adair Pipeline Co. v. Pipeliners Local Union No. 798, 203 F. Supp. 434, 437 (S.D.
Tex. 1962)(only purpose of filing requirement is notice), aff'd, 325 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1963).
In Adair, the counsel for the defendant appeared in open court and informed the judge that the
cause had been removed. Id. at 436. He tendered a copy of the petition and bond to the judge
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Fifth Circuit has gone so far as to determine that not only is a filing
not mandatory, but actual notice is not required and constructive notice to the state court is sufficient. 1°9 In Dukes v. South CarolinaInsurance Co., ' 10 the court found that actual notice to plaintiff's counsel
constituted constructive notice to the court because it was the duty of
plaintiff's counsel, as officers of the court, to advise the state court of
the removal. " The failure to file a copy of the removal petition with
the state court was deemed a procedural defect which would not defeat federal jurisdiction.' 2 As a result, plaintiff's failure to object to
and also gave a copy to counsel for the plaintiff. The judge remarked that "he guessed that
that was all that he could do" and counsel for defendant then left the courthouse. Id. Counsel
for the plaintiff suggested that jurisdiction remained in the state court because a copy of the
petition had not been filed with the clerk of the court pursuant to section 1446(e). The judge
then issued a temporary injunction as requested by the plaintiff. The federal court held, however, that handing the copy to the judge on the bench in open court did constitute compliance
with section 1446(e) and that jurisdiction was removed from the state court. Id. at 437.
Some concern over acceptance of this manner of compliance with the statute was expressed
in a concurring opinion by Justice Gewin of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:
I concur in the result reached, but certainly there is a better manner and method of effecting removal in the circumstances of this case than was employed here. State Judges deserve and are entitled to respect, proper deference, and as much consideration as other
Judges. If an emergency, or circumstances of unusual stress were shown to be present
which prevented counsel for the Appellee from filing his removal petition earlier and
calling the same to the State Judge's attention in a more respectful manner, the method
used would probably be considered appropriate. No such emergency or stress were
shown to exist here.
Adair, 325 F.2d at 207 (Gewin, J., concurring).
109. See, e.g., Butler v. King, 781 F.2d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 1986) (actual or constructive
notice satisfies statute); Dukes v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1985)
(actual or constructive notice sufficient); Medrano v. Texas, 580 F.2d 803, 804 (5th Cir. 1978)
(constructive notice sufficient).
110. 770 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1985).
111. Id. at 547. In Dukes, the defendant sent the state court notice of removal but the
court records did not reflect receipt of any such notice. Id. at 546. Plaintiff and defendant
engaged in discovery in the federal court. Id. at 546-47. On July 20, 1984, plaintiff took a
default judgment against defendant in the state court without informing that court that the
action had been removed and was proceeding in the federal court. Id. at 547. On August 16,
1984, defendant took a summary judgment against plaintiff in federal court. It is apparent that
the Fifth Circuit's ruling concerning constructive notice was appropriate on the facts of this
case because of plaintiff's counsel's egregious behavior. Generally, however, removal requirements are to be strictly construed. Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 1986).
The burden rests on the defendant to see that all requirements are met and proved in order to
properly effect a removal. Abels v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir.
1985). Because plaintiffs should not be made to do jobs statutorily assigned to defendants, the
court's ruling, without limiting it to the facts of this case, appears to be erroneous.
112. Dukes v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Circ. 1985). But see
Ramahi v. Hobart Corp., 615 P.2d 348, 352-53 (Or. Ct. App. 1980)(failure of notice is proce-

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol21/iss1/5

18

Mitchell: Improper Use of Removal and Its Disruptive Effect on State Court

1989]

IMPROPER USE OF REMO VAL

the defect constituted waiver of that requirement. 1 3
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit's approach, the court in Delavigne v.
Delavigne required strict compliance with the notice requirement." 4
Delavigne was a divorce and custody case which the defendant sought
to remove to federal court under section 1443 of title 28.' ' The defendant properly filed the removal petition with the federal court but
failed to file a copy of that petition with the state court.1 6 Instead,
the state court received a "Notice of Filing of Petition for Removal." 1 7 The district court held that this was not sufficient compliance with section 1446(e) and that the automatic stay of state court
proceedings did not take effect until a copy of the petition was actually filed. 1 8
In Lamprecht, defendants Brentwood and Chateau Orleans filed
their verified petition and bond with the proper federal court, yet the
petition was improper on its face. Not all of the named defendants
joined in the removal petition, thus unanimity was lacking."' 9 Defendants argued that the City and City Public Service were not required to join the petition and that they should be aligned with the
plaintiff for diversity purposes because the plaintiff had abandoned
her claim against them. This argument does not pass the test of the
voluntary-involuntary rule. Even if the City and City Public Service

dural defect). In Ramahi, defendants left the courtroom after having filed a "Notice of Filing
Petition for Removal." Id. at 351. The actual copy of the removal petition was not filed until
after the state court had entered its judgment. The Court of Appeals held that the state court
did not lose jurisdiction until the copy was filed and that its proceedings in the interim were
valid. Id. at 353.
113. Dukes, 770 F.2d at 548.
114. 402 F. Supp. 363 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 598 (4th Cir. 1976).
115. Delavigne v. Delavigne, 402 F. Supp. 363, 365 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 598
(4th Cir. 1976).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Delavigne, 402 F. Supp. at 365. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit acknowledged that the failure to file the copy was a significant omission but found that
the district court should not have declared when the removal was effected. Delavigne, 530
F.2d at 601. The Fourth Circuit refused to take a view concerning the correctness of the
district court's declaration, but noted that the Second Circuit accepted substantial compliance
with section 1446(e). Id. at 601 n.5. The Circuit Court stated that the lower court's declaration was dictum and that it should be disregarded. Id. at 602.
119. Petition for Removal at 1, Brentwood Fin. Corp. v. Lamprecht (W.D. Tex. Jan. 17,
1986) (No. SA-86-CA-126). The City of San Antonio and City Public Service did not join the
petition, nor did individual defendants whose names appeared on defendants' removal petition
but against whom plaintiff's action was not actively pursued. Id.
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were effectively dismissed by the state court and that court had no
power to rescind its order, that dismissal would not make the case
removable because it was involuntary on the part of the plaintiff. Indeed, the plaintiff actively opposed the dismissal and had a right to
appeal from the order. 2 1 Unlike Heniford, the plaintiff did not expressly abandon her claims against the resident defendants by specifically requesting that the jury not find against them. 12 ' Lamprecht is
more akin to Aynesworth where the plaintiff left open the possibility of
a verdict against the resident defendant, or to Cudney where the resident defendant was dismissed by court order and plaintiff had a right
to appeal from that dismissal. 22 Because the dismissal of the City
and City Public Service, if effective, was not voluntary, diversity was
lacking and the case did not become removable.
Further complications arise because Brentwood and Chateau Orleans' removal petition was not timely filed. It was alleged that the
petition was filed within thirty days from the time that it was first
ascertained that the case had become removable and that it could not
have been filed earlier because the suit lacked diversity of citizenship."23 As has just been discussed, the action did not become removable at the close of the plaintiff's case. Even if it had, however, the
filing of the petition would still not have been timely because of de24
fendants' failure to seize the first opportunity to remove."
As originally filed, the lawsuit named various citizens of Texas as
plaintiffs, but only one defendant, Brentwood, was a citizen of California. 2 5 The case was removable at that time and the time to re1 26
move began to run when Brentwood received that pleading.
Because Brentwood did not file for removal within thirty days of receipt of that initial pleading, it waived its right to remove and also its
right to join any subsequent removal petition. 127 When Chateau Orle-

120. The time for appeal had not even begun to run when defendants purported to remove the case. Thus, appeal was still a viable alternative.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
123. See Petition for Removal at 2, Lamprecht (No. SA-86-CA-126).
124. Because the case was originally removable, the subsequent dropping of the City and
CPS would not make it "more removable" or "again removable." See Hubbard, 601 F. Supp.
at 795 (subsequent events do not revive right to remove).
125. Plaintiff's Original Petition at 1, Lamprecht v. Brentwood Fin. Corp. (Tex. Dist. Ct.
Jan. 21, 1986) (No. 85CI-00243).
126. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1982)(time runs from receipt of initial pleading).
127. E.g., Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1986)(after initial defendant
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ans was named as a defendant six months later, diversity still existed
but the case was no longer removable because of Brentwood's inability to join. 2 8 Brentwood had effectively waived Chateau Orleans'
right to remove. 129 In any event, Chateau Orleans made no attempt
to remove the case at that time. Because the time to remove expired
in February of 1985,130 a petition for removal filed in January of 1986
could not be timely. Even though the time requirement is "modal and
a petition filed approximately
formal" rather than jurisdictional,'
one year late is improvident at the least and would require a
32

remand. 1
In addition to failing to meet diversity and time elements, Brentwood and Chateau Orleans also failed to comply with the notice provision of section 1446(e) of title 28. Although the state court was
given a "notice of removal," no copy of the removal petition was filed
with that court.' 33 Under the Fifth Circuit's application of the law,
this "notice" document would constitute sufficient compliance with
the requirements of section 1446(e) and the case would have been removed.' 34 The Fourth Court of Appeals, however, took a view similar
to that taken by the federal district court in Delavigne by effectively
holding that the notice handed to the judge was not sufficient compliance with 5the statute and that an actual copy of the petition was
required. 13
fails to timely remove, subsequently joined defendant may not remove); Friedrich v. Whittacker Corp., 467 F. Supp. 1012, 1014 (S.D. Tex. 1979)(subsequently joined defendants may
not remove if initial defendant did not remove timely). Contra Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 702
F. Supp. 19, 21 (D. Mass. 1988)(each defendant has thirty days to file removal).
128. See Friedrich,467 F. Supp. at 1014 (defendant cannot join subsequent removal petition once he has waived right to remove).
129. Id.
130. The original petition was filed on January 7, 1985, and defendant Brentwood answered on January 29, 1985. Thirty days from defendant's receipt of the original petition
would, therefore, fall in February 1985.
131. Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 169 U.S. 92, 98 (1898).
132. See Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1986) (failure to remove
during thirty-day period may render removal improvident).
133. Brentwood Fin. Corp. v. Lamprecht, 736 S.W.2d 836, 844 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The assumption is that no such copy was filed because there is no
indication in the record on appeal showing that a copy was filed. Id.
134. See Dukes v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1985)(even constructive notice is sufficient); see also Adair Pipeline Co. v. Pipeliners Local Union No. 798,
203 F. Supp. 434, 437 (S.D. Tex. 1962)(copy of petition handed to judge in open court sufficient compliance), aff'd, 325 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1963).
135. Lamprecht, 736 S.W.2d at 844. This result is the effect of the court's holding that
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E. Effect of Removal on State Court Jurisdiction
Before 1948, it was clear that the state court could deny a removal
petition and proceed if the state court was not convinced of the validity of a removal petition.' 36 If the case was not "in fact removable,"

then the state court proceedings were valid.13 7 If the case was prop-

erly removable, the state court proceedings subsequent to the removal
were void. 138 Since the 1948 revision, state court action subsequent to
the removal is void regardless of whether or not the case was "in fact
removable."' 3 9 Thus, it has become vitally significant to determine
exactly when a removal is effected and at what point the state court
loses jurisdiction over the case.
Central to the discussion which follows is an understanding of the
difference between a case that is not removable and a case that is not
removed. A case is not removable if it fails to meet the criteria of
section 1441 of title 28 (i.e. complete diversity is lacking or a defendant is a resident of the forum state)."4 The fact that a case is "not
removable" does not mean that it cannot be removed. Such a case
can be automatically removed if the defendant or defendants file a
verified petition and bond with the federal court, file a copy of the
petition with the state court, and give notice to all adverse parties.
When the federal court receives such a case, it will remand the case as
having been removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction," but,
nonetheless, the case will have been removed and the state court will
have lost jurisdiction. Any state court action taken in the case bethe record was inadequate because it did not show that a copy of the petition had been filed.
Id. If the court had deemed the notice to be sufficient compliance with section 1446(e), then
the record would have been sufficient for a ruling on whether the case was effectively removed
and whether the state court properly proceeded to verdict. Id. at 844-45. Had the case been
decided under Fifth Circuit law, the result would have been quite different. See supra text
accompanying note 109.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 171-182.
137. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U.S. 563, 566 (1941); see also infra
text accompanying notes 171-179.

138. Metropolitan Casualty, 312 U.S. at 566; see also infra text accompanying note 172.
139. Hopson v. North Am. Ins. Co., 233 P.2d 799, 802 (Idaho 195 1)(first case to construe
revision); see also infra text accompanying notes 210-217.
140. A case may also not be removable because the thirty-day time period of section 1446
has expired. Because the courts have held this requirement to be mandatory but not jurisdictional, it is possible that a case removed after the time period has run will be accepted by the
federal court. It is likely, though, that such a case will be remanded as having been removed
improvidently. See Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1986) (failure to remove within thirty-day limit may render removal improvident and lead to remand).
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tween 1the effective time of the removal and the time of remand is
4

void. 1

A case that is not removed is one in which defendant has failed to
satisfactorily perform all of the statutory procedures (i.e. filing a petition and bond, filing a copy with the state court, giving notice to adversaries). If removal is never properly effected, the state court never
loses jurisdiction of the case, and it is free to proceed to judgment. 42
The courts are in agreement that the federal court acquires jurisdiction over a removed case when the petition and bond are filed in the
federal court. 143 The courts also agree that the state court does not
lose jurisdiction over the case until the procedural steps of removal
are completed, but they differ in their construction of sufficient compliance with the procedural requirements. Some form of notice to the
state court is universally required, ' but as has previously been noted,
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has consistently held that
even constructive notice of the removal is sufficient. 14 Other courts
require strict compliance with all of the statutory procedures before
state jurisdiction is ousted.' 46 A similar source of conflict is the effect
of noncompliance with the requirement of giving notice to adverse
parties. Some courts hold that the state court does not lose jurisdiction until notice is given to the plaintiff. 147 Other courts hold that the
141. Annotation, Effect, On Jurisdictionof State Court, of 28 US.CS. § 1446(e), Relating
to Removal of Civil Case to Federal Court, 38 A.L.R. FED. 824, 831 (1978).
142. See id. at 831, 833-34 (failure to accomplish statutory steps defeats claim that state
court acted without jurisdiction).
143. See, e.g., Berberian v. Gibney, 514 F.2d 790, 792 (1st Cir. 1975) (federal jurisdiction
attaches when removal petition filed); Howes v. Childers, 426 F. Supp. 358, 360 (E.D. Ky.
1977) (federal jurisdiction attaches when petition filed); Hornung v. Master Tank & Welding
Co., 151 F. Supp. 169, 172 (D.N.D. 1957) (federal jurisdiction vests when petition filed).
144. See Medrano v. Texas, 580 F.2d 803, 804 (5th Cir. 1989)(lack of any notice, either
actual or constructive, will not divest state court of jurisdiction).
145. See, e.g., Butler v. King, 781 F.2d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 1986) (actual or constructive
notice sufficient); Dukes v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1985) (actual
or constructive notice sufficient); Murray v. Ford Motor Co., 770 F.2d 461, 463 (5th Cir. 1985)
(state court has jurisdiction until given actual or constructive notice).
146. See Beleos v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee, 161 F. Supp. 627, 628 (E.D.S.C.
1956)(procedures contained in 1446(e) mandatory conditions precedent to termination of state
court jurisdiction); Crown Const. Co. v. Newfoundland Am. Ins. Co., 239 A.2d 452, 455 (Pa.
1968)(notice and copy requirements not modal or formal but mandatory conditions precedent
to termination of state court jurisdiction).
147. E.g., Beleos, 161 F. Supp. at 628; McClure v. Kelley, 268 S.E.2d 393, 394 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1980); Green Seed Co. v. Harrison Tobacco Storage Warehouse, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 755,
757 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
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court is ousted of jurisdiction once it receives notice of the removal,
whether plaintiff has been given notice or not. 148
Between the time when the federal court acquires jurisdiction of the
case and the time the state court loses jurisdiction, however that time
is measured, both courts may exercise jurisdiction over the case. 49 In
the event of conflicting proceedings, the federal court predominates.'50 The completion of the removal process has effect retroactive
to the date the removal petition was filed with the federal court. 5 '
For example, in Master Equipment, Inc. v. Home Insurance Co., the

defendant filed its removal petition with the federal court on September 21.152 A copy was forwarded to plaintiff's attorney on September
22, yet the plaintiff took a state court default on September 28. A
copy of the removal petition was filed with the state court on October
1. The court held that between September 21, and October 1, the
state and federal courts had dual jurisdiction. 53 After the copy was
filed with the state court, the removal process was completed and the
notice operated retroactively to "effect the removal" as of the date the
petition was filed with the federal court. 54
' The court found that the
state court default was a nullity and ordered it stricken. 1 1
Once a case is effectively removed, the state court is powerless to
proceed unless and until the action is remanded by the federal
court. 56 "This acts as a protective device which keeps separate tribu148. See Howes v. Childers, 426 F. Supp. 358, 360 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (recognizes that some
courts require completion of all steps before state jurisdiction lost); Barrett v. Southern Ry.
Co., 68 F.R.D. 413, 419 (D.S.C. 1975)(actual notice to adversary is sufficient). Contra Nebraska v. Lehman, 278 N.W.2d 610, 615 (Neb. 1979) (jurisdiction not ousted without proper
notice to plaintiff).
149. Berberian v. Gibney, 514 F.2d 790, 792-93 (1st Cir. 1975); Windac Corp. v. Clarke,
530 F. Supp. 812, 814 (D. Neb. 1982); Master Equipment, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 342 F. Supp.
549, 551 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
150. Windac Corp., 530 F. Supp. at 814; Master Equipment, 342 F. Supp. at 552;
Hornung v. Master Tank & Welding Co., 151 F. Supp. 159, 172 (D.N.D. 1957).
151. See, e.g., Master Equipment, 342 F. Supp. at 551 (retroactive effect); Hornung, 151
F. Supp. at 172 (removal order effect retroactive to filing); Shenandoah Chamber of Progress v.
Frank Assocs., 95 F. Supp. 719, 720 (E.D. Pa. 1950)(retroactive effect). But see 14A C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3737, at 549-50
(2d ed. 1985)(no retroactive effect because removal not effective until all statutory steps taken).
152. 342 F. Supp. 549, 550-51 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
153. Master Equipment, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 342 F. Supp. 549, 550-51 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 551-52.
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1982)(current version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(e) (West Supp.
1989)).
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'
nals from adjudicating the merits of the same controversy." 157
If the
federal court finds that the action was not properly removed, it will
order the case remanded. 5 ' Section 1447(c) requires that "[a] certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by its clerk to the
clerk of the State court. The State court may thereupon proceed with
such case."' 59 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has also
taken a lenient view toward this requirement. In Johnson v. Estelle,160
the federal court made an oral order of remand, in the presence of the
parties, on April 14, 1975. This oral order was followed by a written
order on May 27, 1975, which was backdated to April 14.161 The
Fifth Circuit held that because the parties were present in the federal
forum at the time of the oral order and thus received notice of the
remand, the oral order accompanied by a backdated written order
162
was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the state court.
It is clear from the discussion above that the Lamprecht case was
not removable.1 63 Even so, federal jurisdiction attached in Lamprecht
at approximately noon on January 15, 1986, when the petition for
removal was filed. Jurisdiction was shared with the state court at that

157. Wood v. DeWeese, 305 F. Supp. 939, 941 (W.D. Ky. 1969).
158. Prior to the 1988 amendment, section 1447(c) read as follows: "If at any time before
final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction,
the district court shall remand the case ...." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982). The United States
Supreme Court held that the only grounds upon which a federal court can remand a case to the
state court are that the case was removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction." See
Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 342-45 (1976)(only authorized to
remand on statutory grounds). The amended statute now provides that "[i]f at any time before
final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall
be remanded." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(c) (West Supp. 1989). The amendment also states that any
motion to remand based upon defective removal procedure must be made within 30 days after
the filing of the notice of removal. Id. Following the spirit of Thermtron, these are the only
grounds for remand. Both before and after amendment, the statute states that an order of
remand is not reviewable "on appeal or otherwise." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1982)(current version at U.S.C.A. § 1447(d) (West Supp. 1989)); see also FDIC v. Santiago Plaza, 598 F.2d 634,
636 (1st Cir. 1979) (no review on appeal or otherwise).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982).
160. 625 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1980).
161. Johnson v. Estelle, 625 F.2d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1980). "The record does not disclose
when, if ever, that order was certified and served by the federal court clerk on the clerk of the
Texas Criminal District Court." Id.
162. Id.
163. To recap the defects in removability, Lamprecht lacked diversity of citizenship, it
did not pass the voluntary-involuntary test, the removal was not timely, and unanimity was
lacking because of Brentwood and Chateau Orleans' prior waiver of their right to remove. See
supra text accompanying notes 119-135.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University,

25

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 21 [], No. 1, Art. 5

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:59

time because the remaining steps in the removal process had not been
completed. At approximately 2:00 p.m. that same day, the defendants
purported to complete the removal steps. The Fourth Court of Appeals considered Lamprecht not only a case that was not removable,
but also one that was not removed. Because a copy of the petition
was not filed with the state court, the removal was never effected and
the state court never lost jurisdiction. The court was free to proceed
to judgment without any further notice to defendants, who had voluntarily left the courtroom. 64
If the Lamprecht court had applied Fifth Circuit law, the result
would have been very different. The Fifth Circuit holds that constructive notice to the state court is sufficient compliance with section
1446(e). 16 5 Therefore, the Lamprecht court certainly would have considered the actual notice, both in writing and in defendants' oral pronouncement in open court, as sufficient compliance. The case would
have been considered one that was not removable yet one which was
removed. The removal would have been effected at the time of notice
to the state court, retroactive to the time the petition was filed with
the federal court, and the state court would have been stayed from
66
any further action unless and until the action was remanded.
Although the Lamprecht court refrained from actually proceeding
to judgment until it had received notice that the removal was improper, some proceedings were held in the case between the departure
of the defendants and the phone call from the federal court.1 67 Under

164. See Brentwood Fin. Corp. v. Lamprecht, 736 S.W.2d 836, 845 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(no abuse of discretion to continue trial without presence of
defendants).
165. See Butler v. King, 781 F.2d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 1986)(constructive notice sufficient);
Dukes v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1985)(constructive notice
sufficient).
166. The anamoly here is that if the removal was retroactive to the noon filing in the
federal court, then the state court would lose jurisdiction before even defendants acknowledged
that federal diversity jurisdiction was created. This is because defendants alleged that diversity
was created when plaintiff rested her case, but this did not occur until 2:00 that afternoon.
167. Lamprecht, 736 S.W.2d at 844. The oral remand followed by a nunc pro tunc order
is valid under the holding of Johnson v. Estelle. 625 F.2d 75, 78 (5th Cir. 1980). Lamprecht
can be distinguished from Johnson, however, because the parties were not present at the time
of the oral remand, and the defendants apparently were not given notice of that remand until
after the trial was resumed. Furthermore, the federal court in San Antonio apparently considered the case as one which had been effectively, though improperly, removed because it issued
a remand order. Presumably, if the case had never been removed, a remand would have been
inappropriate.
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the analysis of the Fourth Court of Appeals, this interim action is
valid because the removal was never effected. Under Fifth Circuit
analysis, though, the action was removed at the time the notice of
removal was handed to the state judge and any action occurring
before receipt of the telephoned remand is void. A further effect of
the application of Fifth Circuit law is that even those proceedings taking place after the remand are void because of the state court's failure
to notify defendants that the trial would resume. The state appellate
court excused the lack of notice because the case was never actually
removed, but if the removal was effected, then notice of the resumption of the state court trial would have been required. Removal itself
would invalidate action taken between the removal and the remand,
and failure to give notice of resumption of the trial would invalidate
the state court actions subsequent to the remand.
IV.
A.

REMOVAL PROCEDURE AND EFFECT BEFORE AND
IMMEDIATELY AFTER 1948 REVISION

Removal ProcedureBefore 1948

Removal has been a part of the American judicial system for 200
years. The Judicial Act of 1789 permitted certain state court suits to
be removed to the federal circuit courts. 168 Removal laws underwent
numerous corrections and revisions before being overhauled in
1948,169 but the procedure for removal was quite consistent throughout. 170 In most cases, the removing party presented its petition for
removal to the state court. 17 1 If the case was removable, then the
168. IA J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.156, at 13 (2d ed. 1987).
169. See id. at 13-29 (complete history of removal); see also E. SPEER, REMOVAL
CAUSES FROM THE STATE TO FEDERAL COURTS, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAW

OF

(1888) (history

of removal prior to 1888).
170. Some significant changes were made during this time. For example, the Act of
March 3, 1875 allowed either plaintiff or defendant to remove an action. Act of March 3,
1875, ch. 137, 18 (pt. 3) Stat. 470 § 2; see also IA J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 0.156, at 17-18 (2d ed. 1987). The Judicial Act of 1887 restricted the right of removal to
defendants only. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, as corrected by Act of
August 13, 1888, ch. 866, § 2, 25 Stat. 433, 434; see also IA J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 0.156, at 17-18 (2d ed. 1987).
171. IA J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.168, at 535 (2d ed. 1987). Removal petitions were filed in federal court for actions brought against federal officers and
where removal was based on prejudice or local influence. Brown, Removal Procedure Under
the Revised Judicial Code, 19 U. CIN. L. REV. 171, 174 (1950); Note, State-Federal Court
Conflicts Over the Removability of Causes: The Prospect Under the New Judicial Code, 98 U.
PA. L. REV. 80, 81 (1949).
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state court lost jurisdiction upon the filing of the petition and bond,
72 If
and any subsequent proceedings in the state court were void.
upon the face of the record, including the petition, the suit did not
appear to be removable, the state court was not bound to surrender its
jurisdiction and could proceed as if no application for removal had
been made. 73 In making its determination of removability the state
court was required to accept the fact allegations of the petition as
true. 74 The subsequent determination of removability by the federal
court presented a mixed question of law and fact. 1 75 If the federal
court found that the case was not in fact removable, the state court's
176
actions following the application for removal would be valid.
Merely filing the petition would not work to transfer the case if the
suit was not actually removable,177 and federal jurisdiction could not
attach until the state court had a duty to proceed no further."'7 "The
jurisdiction is changed when the removal is demanded in properform

and a case for removal made.
If the state court denied defendant's petition for removal, the defendant was faced with three alternative courses of action: he could
object to the denial of his petition, save an exception for appeal and
continue to litigate in the state court; he could remove to the federal
court despite the state court's ruling; or he could proceed in both
"179

172. Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 244 (1905);
see also Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U.S. 430, 432 (1886)(if case removed, state jurisdiction
ceases upon filing petition and bond); Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118, 122
(1882)(state jurisdiction ceases upon filing of petition and bond, "the suit being removable
under the statute").
173. Madisonville Traction Co., 196 U.S. at 244; Butler v. King, 781 F.2d 486, 488 (5th
Cir. 1986) (state court does not lose jurisdiction until petition shows party can remove as
matter of right).
174. Note, Court-U.S. Code, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure-Removal of Causes
Under the Revised Judicial Code, 33 MINN. L. REV. 738, 754 (1949); Note, State-Federal
Court Conflicts Over the Removability of Causes: The Prospect Under the New Judicial Code,
98 U. PA. L. REV. 80, 81 (1949).
175. Note, State-Federal Court Conflicts Over the Removability of Causes: The Prospect
Under the New Judicial Code, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 80, 81 (1949). This note points out "a case in
which the state court properly allowed removal might be remanded equally properly by the
federal court after the facts had been decided against the defendant." Id.
176. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U.S. 563, 566 (1941).
177. Crehore v. Ohio & Mississippi Ry. Co., 131 U.S. 240, 244 (1889); Stone v. South
Carolina, 117 U.S. 430, 432 (1886).
178. Crehore, 131 U.S. at 244; Railroad Co. v. Koontz, 104 U.S. 5, 14 (1881).
179. Koontz, 104 U.S. at 14 (emphasis added).
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courts at the same time. 10 The state court also had a choice. It could
proceed with the action and risk having the final judgment reversed if
its ruling on the removal petition was erroneous,1 8 1 or if there was any
doubt as to removability, the court could stay its action until the federal court resolved the matter. The United States Supreme Court recommended that if the state court was assured that the federal court
would decide the question of removability promptly, then "it is better
practice to await that decision [citations omitted] but we cannot say
that failure to do so is a denial of a federal right if the cause was not
removable.""8 2
Had Lamprecht been subject to the removal laws as they existed
before 1948, the conflict which this article addresses could not have
arisen. The defendants would have presented their removal petition
to the state court, and that court would have denied the petition for
lack of diversity." 3 Whether or not the defendants chose to pursue
the removal in federal court, the state court trial would have proceeded, and the defendants would have had to bear any risk attendant
in absenting themselves from the proceedings. No notification to the
defendants of intent to continue the trial would be required. Had the
defendants pursued a ruling from the federal court, that court would
have ruled that the defendants were not entitled to remove' 84 and that
the state court had not lost jurisdiction. Thus, all state court proceedings subsequent to the presentation of the removal petition would
have been valid. Even if the defendants believed that the removal was
proper, when faced with the possibility that the state court action
would be deemed valid, it is unlikely that they would have walked out
on the trial. If the removal in Lamprecht was attempted solely as a
trial strategy, removal under pre-1948 law would have been of no ben-

180. Metropolitan Casualty, 312 U.S. at 567; see also Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S.
118, 123 (1882)(defendant may defend in state court without forfeiting or impairing right to
trial in federal court).
181. Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U.S. 430, 432-33 (1886); see also Minus v. Grote, 154
S.W.2d 140, 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941, no writ)(state court may proceed at peril of
having orders and judgment set aside).
182. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U.S. 563, 569 (1941).
183. The court could find a lack of diversity either by application of the voluntary-involuntary rule following dismissal of the City and CPS, or by the fact that its order of dismissal
was rescinded and the resident defendants remained parties to the suit.
184. Defendants were not entitled to remove for the same reasons as cited by the nuncpro
tunc order of remand previously cited. Supra note 36.
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efit to defendants because it would not have resulted in a mistrial, or
even a delay of the state trial.
B.

The 1948 Revision and 1949 Amendment

Before 1948, removal jurisdiction and procedure were difficult and
confusing because the statutes had been amended over the years in a
piecemeal fashion, and the amendments had been scattered throughout various code sections. 8 1 In 1948, the removal statutes underwent
a significant overhaul in an effort to integrate them into one coherent
scheme, 18 and to "overcome the endless and multiple litigation and
resulting severe hardships which arose under [prior removal law] as
construed."' 87 The amendments repealed obsolete provisions, consolidated related provisions, employed clearer language, and separated
jurisdictional provisions from procedural provisions. 18 Previously,
the state court would determine removability as a question of law,
accepting the facts as given in the petition, while the federal court
could reach a different result by determining removability as a question of law and fact. 8 9 Under the new, integrated removal law, all
removal petitions were filed in, and determined by, the federal
court."'9 It was believed that this procedure would decrease conflicts
between the state and federal courts because state courts, no longer
empowered to decide questions of removability, would be unlikely to
proceed until the federal court had resolved the issue. 91 Following
the 1948 revision, no removal order was necessary to stop proceedings
185. Brown, Removal Procedure Under the Revised Judicial Code, 19 U. CIN. L. REV.
171, 171 (1950); Wills & Boyer, Proposed Changes in Federal Removal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 257 (1948).
186. Wills & Boyer, Proposed Changes in Federal Removal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 9
OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 257 (1948); see also Note, State-Federal Court Conflicts Over the Removability of Causes: The Prospect Under the New Judicial Code, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 80, 80 (1949)(first
attempt at thorough integration and clarification).
187. Hopson v. North American Ins. Co., 233 P.2d 799, 802 (Idaho 1951).
188. Brown, Removal Procedure under the Revised Judicial Code, 19 U. CIN. L. REV.
171, 171-72 (1950).
189. Wills & Boyer, Proposed Changes in Federal Removal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 9
OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 271-72 (1948).
190. Brown, Removal Procedure under the Revised Judicial Code, 19 U. CIN. L. REV.
171, 171-74 (1950). The new law effected other changes by including a uniform time requirement (except that the time requirement for removal of criminal cases remained different from
civil cases) and the requirement that written notice was to be given to adversaries promptly
following removal rather than before filing the removal petition and bond. Id. at 176, 195.
191. Id. at 175.
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in the state court. 192

Removal was effected automatically when the

petition and bond were filed, written notice was given to adversaries,
and a copy of the petition was filed with the state court. 193 At that
point the state court could not proceed further unless the case was
remanded. 94
The 1948 revision was followed in 1949 by an amendment intended
to correct typographical errors, other minor errors and to "clarifly]
the language of some sections to conform more closely to the original
law, or to remove ambiguities which have been discovered."' 9 5 A
change which is not specifically mentioned in the legislative history
was made in section 1446(e). Where the 1948 revision stated that the
' 96
state court shall proceed no further "unless the case is remanded,"'
the language of the 1949 amendment reads that the court shall proceed no further "unless and until the case is remanded."' 97 This revision could be read as support for the view that the revisers intended to
change the effect of the law so that all state court action between removal and remand is void. The language "unless the case is remanded" leaves open the possibility of continuing with the action and
holding that continuation valid if the case is remanded but void if it is
not. The language "unless and until the case is remanded" seems to
mandate that the state court has no option to proceed at all until the
case is remanded. Because the legislative history concerning this
amendment does not indicate any intent to materially alter the effect

192. Id. at 197.
193. Id.at 197. The pre-1948 statute provided that upon the filing of the removal petition and bond with the state court "[i]t
shall then be the duty of the State court to accept said
petition and bond and proceed no further in such suit." Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36
Stat. 1095. Notice to adversaries was required to be given prior to filing the petition. Id. The
1948 revision provided that filing of the removal petition and bond must be accompanied by
notice to adversaries and filing a copy with the state court, "which shall effect the removal and
the State court shall proceed no further therein unless the case is remanded." Act of June 25,
1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 939 (emphasis added). It is this language effecting the removal that has
been construed to mean that removal is automatic.
194. Brown, Removal Procedure under the Revised Judicial Code, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 171,
197-98 (1950).
195. S.REP. No. 303, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1949 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1248, 1248. For example, the procedure for removal was amended "to make it
fit the diverse procedural laws of the various States." Id. Section 1446(e) was amended to
clarify the intent that notice of the filing of the petition need not be given simultaneously with
the filing, but may be given promptly thereafter. Id. at 1268.
196. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 939.
197. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, 63 Stat. 102 (emphasis added).
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of removal on the state court's interim jurisdiction,' 9 this change in
the language of the statute should probably be regarded as merely the
correction of a minor misstatement or typographical error.1 99
Written commentary at the time of the revision and amendment
demonstrates the confusion surrounding the effect of the new law on
the state court's ability to proceed and the validity of such proceedings in a case which was not properly removable. In an article written
in 1948, while the new law was pending in the legislature, the authors
asserted that "it will still be possible, if H.R. 3214 is enacted as it now
stands, for a state court to proceed in an action after a federal court
has granted a petition to remove. ' '2° It was their opinion that the
language "the state court shall proceed no further" would not prevent
the state court from continuing because similar language in the law at
that time had not prevented such conflicts. 201 The authors proposed
that a statute be enacted providing that if the federal court remands a
case then "any proceedings taken in the state court while the federal
court was asserting jurisdiction, and in conflict with the federal
court's asserted jurisdiction, shall be void. '2 2 An exception would be
made when "from the face of the record the case is clearly not removable."2 3 In such a case the state court would not lose jurisdiction
while the case was pending in the federal court.2 °4 It is obvious from
this commentary and the proposed statutory solution that the authors
envisioned a continuing conflict between the state and federal courts.

198. The legislative history of the revision also does not address this issue or indicate a
deliberate intent to change the effect of removal on the state courts.
199. See South Carolina v. Moore, 447 F.2d 1067, 1073 n.16 (4th Cir. 1971) (revisers did
not explain change).
200. Wills & Boyer, Proposed Changes in FederalRemoval Jurisdiction and Procedure, 9
OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 273 (1948).
201. Id. at 273 n.90. For example, the Act of March 3, 1911, chapter 231, reads that
after the filing of a petition and bond by a party entitled to remove, "[i]t
shall then be the duty
of the State court to accept said petition and bond and proceed no further in such suit." 36

Stat. 1095.
202. Wills & Boyer, Proposed Changes in FederalRemoval Jurisdiction and Procedure, 9
OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 274 (1948).
203. Id. at 275 (quoting Grote v. Price, 139 Tex. 472, 476, 163 S.W.2d 1059, 1060
(1942)).
204. Id. One problem with this approach is that it requires a determination of "clearly
not removable." This will likely lead to more litigation, delay and expense. A bright line rule
would be more advantageous. Either the state court loses jurisdiction or it does not; either
subsequent action is valid upon remand or it is not. The same rule must apply evenly to all
cases.
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The revised removal laws were not viewed as clearly prohibiting continued action in the state court or clearly invalidating any such action.
Other scholars, writing soon after the enactment of the new law,
also believed that the revision failed to resolve the conflict between the
state and federal courts between the time of removal and the time of
remand. One author maintained:
[T]he possibility that the state court and the plaintiff may disregard the
petition and continue to prosecute the case in the state court is still
present. Section 1446(e) commands the state court to 'effect the removal' and 'proceed no further therein' upon the filing of a copy of the
petition with the clerk of the state court. But this is little stronger than
the language of the old code. It seems, therefore, that if the case is in
fact not removable, subsequent proceedings in the state court are valid,
and that all of the perplexities of a potential dual trial persist.2" 5
Another author also agreed that even under the revised law it was
possible for "some state courts to insist on proceeding with a case 2on
06
the ground that the face of the petition shows no right of removal.
This author maintained that the revised statute was seriously defective because it did not attack the doctrine that remand signifies that
the state court never lost jurisdiction. 20 7 It was asserted that if the
federal courts considered removal questions promptly then few state
courts would be unwilling to stay their hands. 20 8 Even so, the author
recommended that "it might be advisable to provide for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order as a matter of course upon the filing
of a removal petition and bond."2 9
These writings reveal that the effect of the 1948 revision on the
validity of state court action between removal and remand was open
to question. Although this effect is of the utmost importance to the
state courts, the confusion and ambiguity surrounding this issue demonstrates that any change on this point was not explicit and may not
have been intended by the revisers. The legislature failed to further

205. Note, Courts-US. Code, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure-Removal of Causes
Under the Revised JudicialCode, 33 MINN. L. REV. 738, 755 (1949).
206. Note, State-FederalCourt Conflicts Over the Removablilty of Causes. The Prospect

Under the New Judicial Code, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 80, 85 (1949).
207. Id. at 90. By extension, the revision was not viewed as attacking the doctrine that
state court action before remand was valid if the case was not removable.
208. Id. at 87.
209. Id. at 89.
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amend the statute to clarify its intent and resolution of the issue was
left to the courts.
Despite the fact that the commentators construed the new law as
sustaining the ability of the state court to proceed and the validity of
such actions in subsequently remanded cases, the courts did not follow suit. The first case to construe the effect of the 1948 revision on
the validity of state court action between removal and remand was

Hopson v. North American Insurance Co. 2 1o In that case, the defend-

ant properly complied with removal procedures on February 27,
1950. On March 27, 1950, the plaintiff moved for default in state
court. This motion was granted. On April 6, 1950, plaintiff moved
the federal court for remand. An order granting this motion was entered on June 16, 1950. The following day, defendant moved the state
court to vacate the default. The default was then vacated and set
aside.2 ' The primary issue on appeal was "what effect, if any, the
proceedings pending in the Federal District Court for the removal of
the cause from the State District Court, which is not removable, have
upon any proceedings taken in the State District Court while such
proceedings were pending in the Federal Court and before the cause is
remanded to the State District Court.

'2 12

The court noted that the

language of the prior removal statute spoke of "any party entitled to
remove any suit.

. ."

while the language of section 1446 after amend-

ment spoke of "defendant or defendants desiring to remove. "2 13 After
reviewing accepted law under the prior statute holding that proceedings in the state court following a petition for removal were valid if
the suit was not in fact removable, the court concluded that this was
no longer the case after the 1948 revision.214 The court reasoned that
jurisdiction was moved to federal court under the prior statute only
when the proper procedural steps were taken by a party entitled to
remove. 2 5 The statute now permits removal by parties desiring to,
though not necessarily entitled to, remove a case. The Idaho court
also noted that the amended statute expressly provides that taking the
210. 233 P.2d 799 (Idaho 1951).
211. Hopson v. North Am. Ins. Co., 233 P.2d 799, 799-800 (Idaho 1951).
212. Id. at 800.
213. Id. at 800 (emphasis added).; see also Lowe v. Jacobs, 243 F.2d 432, 433 (5th Cir.
1957)(noting distinction between "entitled to reverse" and "desiring to reverse"), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 842 (1957).
214. Hopson, at 802.
215. Id. at 800 (emphasis added).
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required procedural steps "effects the removal of the cause to the Federal Court. ' 2 16 Because this language was not included in the prior
law, the court concluded that Congress intended that a case is removed "irrespective of the ultimate determination of the question as
to whether or not it is removable" and that "[r]emovability is no
longer a criterion which gives or denies validity to the proceedings in
the State court while a petition for removal to the Federal Court is
pending; any such proceedings in the State court under the present act
are not sanctioned; they are prohibited. ' 21 7 Other courts have universally accepted and followed this construction of the revised removal
statutes.
Applying the reasoning of the Hopson court to the Lamprecht case,
it is evident how defendants Brentwood and Chateau Orleans could
have removed the case to federal court if they had performed the removal procedures properly. Defendants were not entitled to remove
because of jurisdictional deficiencies such as a lack of diversity.
Under the prior law this deficiency would have been sufficient to prevent the ouster of state court jurisdiction. After the revision, as construed by the courts, however, once defendants merely performed the
prescribed steps, removal was effected invalidating any subsequent
state court proceedings. 218 As previously discussed, the case would be
removed despite the fact that it was not removable.
V.

AMENDMENT OF NOVEMBER

19, 1988

On November 19, 1988, the legislature enacted the Judicial Improvements Act. Section 1016 of that act deals specifically with improvements in removal procedure.2 19 Section 1441(a) was amended
by adding a sentence which reads: "For purposes of removal under
this chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names
shall be disregarded. '220 This provision simply codifies previous case
law.22 1
The procedure for removing actions was amended in three signifi216. Hopson v. North Am. Ins. Co., 233 P.2d 799, 802 (Idaho 1951).

217. Id.
218. Even though defendants desired to remove the case, the removal was not effected
because, as previously discussed, defendants failed to properly perform the statutory steps.
219. See Judicial Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702 § 1016, 102 Stat. 4642, 4669

(1988).
220. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a) (West Supp. 1989).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66.
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cant respects. First, a verified petition is no longer required. Instead,
a defendant desiring to remove a case must now file with the federal
court a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure containing a brief statement of the basis for
removal. 22 2 There is no specific indication in the statute how this "notice of removal" will differ from the removal petition previously required. Second, the legislature completely deleted the bond
requirement. 223 These two changes would appear to make removal
easier to accomplish. The third change, however, places a new restriction on removal. Section 1446(b) was amended by adding the
following language at the end of the second paragraph: 224 "[E]xcept
that a case may not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction conferred
by section 1332 of this title [diversity] more than 1 year after com225
mencement of the action.1
Had these amendments applied to Lamprecht, the case would probably still have been remanded, but the effect of the removal on the
state court trial would have been far more intrusive. The notice given
to the judge at the time of removal would have been sufficient to effect
the removal because a petition is no longer required.22 6 On the other
hand, the removal would not have been timely because the basis of
federal jurisdiction was diversity and more than one year had passed
since the commencement of the action.2 27 Because the statutory
amendment does not address the effect of the time requirement, it is
reasonable to anticipate that the courts will construe it as they have
construed the thirty-day filing requirement: the one year limitation is

222. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(a) (West Supp. 1989).
223. Id. § 1446(d).
224. Id. § 1446(b). The second paragraph of 1446(b) provides for removal of cases which
were not removable as originally stated by filing for removal within thirty days of receipt by
defendant of notice that the case is or has become removable. Id.
225. Judicial Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702 § 1016, 102 Stat. 4642, 4669

(1988).
226. The amendment replaced "petition for removal" with "notice of removal" everywhere that it appears in 1446(b). 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b) (West Supp. 1989). Presumably the
legislature also intended that references to the removal petition in subsection (e), now subsection (d), would also be replaced with "notice of removal." Thus, the statute would require that
the removing party file a notice of removal with the state court clerk.
227. The action commenced on January 7, 1985 and the removal was attempted on January 15, 1986. Plaintiff's Original Petition at 1, Lamprecht v. Brentwood Fin. Corp. (Tex. Dist.
Ct. Jan. 21, 1986) (No. 85CI-00243); Statement of Facts at 545, Lamprecht (No. 85CI-00243).
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not jurisdictional, but is modal and formal. 22 8 Failure to comply with
this time restriction should still have subjected defendants to remand,
providing that a motion for remand raising this procedural defect was
filed within thirty days of the notice of removal. 229 Thus, Lamprecht
would likely have been remanded to the state court. 2 30 The state
court would have lost jurisdiction, and any state court action which
occurred before that remand would have been void, however, because
the removal had been effected at the time the notice was handed to the
judge. Continuation with the trial after the remand would also have
been void for failure to notify defendants of the court's intent to resume proceedings.2 3 '

VI.
A.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

1988 Amendment

The one year limitation now contained in section 1446(b) will serve
to prevent some removals from taking place during trial or on the eve
of trial because most civil cases do not reach the courtroom within
one year of commencement of the action. It is not, however, an impossibility. Lamprecht, itself, illustrates the potential for preparing a
case quickly and getting to trial in approximately one year. Indeed,
the Lamprecht trial commenced one year and six days from the date

the action was originally filed. If the one year limit is strictly applied,
then removal will be prevented in cases such as this. As previously
noted, however, the courts do not view time limitations as jurisdictional in removed actions. 232 Thus, removal approximately within
one year may be acceptable, cases like Lamprecht may be found to be
in sufficient compliance with this new requirement, and removal dur228. See Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 169 U.S. 92, 98 (1898)(time for filing
petition is "modal and formal" not jurisdictional).
229. See Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1986)(remand for case improvidently removed because not timely).
230. It is possible that the federal court would have found the removal to have been
sufficiently close in time to preclude remand. Defendants missed the one year cut-off date by
only eight days. This author maintains that both this time limitation and the thirty-day filing
rule should be strictly applied.
231. In ratifying the state court's actions subsequent to the removal, the Fourth Court of
Appeals relied on defendants' failure to properly effect the removal by failing to file an actual
copy of the petition with the state court. This is no longer required after the 1988 amendment
and the reasoning used by the appellate court would no longer apply.
232. See supra text accompanying note 75.
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ing trial may continue to occur. 2 3
A further problem with the 1988 amendment as a solution to the
problem of disruption of state trials is that the new time limitation
does not prevent the automatic effect of fulfilling removal procedures.
In fact, the omission of a bond requirement and replacement of a verified petition with a notice of removal will make removal easier to accomplish during trial and will serve to exacerbate the problem. If
removal is not effected within the one year window, the case will be
remanded, yet the state trial will still have been disrupted and the
court ousted of jurisdiction. Any action taken by the state court between removal and remand will be void. Until the legislature addresses this effect of automatic removal, instead of merely addressing
removal procedures, unwarranted interference with state court proceedings will continue. For this reason, the recent amendment to the
removal statutes does not present a viable solution to the problem
presented.
B.

Return to Pre-1948 Construction

A return to pre-1948 construction of the effect of removal on state
court jurisdiction could be accomplished while retaining the beneficial
procedural changes made by the revision. To do so, however, would
require strict application of the requirement of filing a copy of the
removal petition (now notice) with the state court before removal can
be effected. While not authorized to make a final determination of
removability, the state court would be given the opportunity to review
the removal petition and, if it found the petition to be meritless, to
proceed with the action. If the case is properly removable, (and properly removed), then such action is void. If, however, the case is not
removable and is remanded then such action is valid.
This construction, while removing the incentive for improper removal, recreates problems of wasted effort and resources unless accompanied by a provision requiring prompt review by the federal
court to prevent duplication of proceedings in both courts. To this
233. This case illustrates how the one year limitation may be under-inclusive because
improper removal may still occur during trial. The limitation may also be over-inclusive because it prevents removal of cases which properly become removable more than one year from
commencement of the action. The amendment may encourage plaintiffs to include resident
defendants in their pleadings for one year simply to avoid removal, and then to dismiss them
after the deadline has passed. This is as much an abuse of the removal statutes as removing a
case for purposes of delay or disruption.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol21/iss1/5

38

Mitchell: Improper Use of Removal and Its Disruptive Effect on State Court

19891

IMPROPER USE OF REMOVAL

end, it might be wise to reverse the automatic effect of removal and
require entry of an order granting removal in federal court before the
suit may proceed in that court and before the state court is prohibited
from proceeding. It is obvious that this solution cannot be effected by
a mere change in construction of the present law. First, after forty
years of consistent construction of the removal laws, courts will be
unwilling, and unable because of the doctrine of stare decisis, to suddenly reverse themselves on the effect of removal and its automatic
nature. Second, language changes made in the 1948 revision and 1949
amendment 23 4 preclude altering the construction of the statute in the
absence of congressional action. It is apparent, therefore, that simply
reconstruing the statute and returning to the pre-1948 status quo is
not a viable solution.
C.

Sanctions

One of the most common methods of discouraging the abuse of
legal procedures is to impose sanctions for their misuse. Before
amendment in 1988, section 1447(c) of the removal laws empowered
the federal court to "order the payment of just costs" 2'3 5 upon the
remand of a case removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction."2'3 6 In applying section 1447(c), many courts differentiate between the award of costs and the award of attorney fees. Costs are
discretionary under section 1447(c), but they generally will be
awarded where the nonremovability of the action is obvious.2 3 7 If the
removal is improper but there is no apparent bad faith, then costs will
be awarded but not attorney fees.238 If the action was removed in bad
faith, then attorney fees are allowed under 1447(c) as part of "just

234. For example, the revision changed "entitled to" to "desiring to" and added the language "which shall effect the removal." The import of these changes is discussed supra pp. 8593.
235. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982)(current version 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(c) (West Supp.
1989)).
236. Id.
237. Tralmer v. Galaxy Airlines, 611 F. Supp. 633, 635 (D. Nev. 1985); Olsen v. Olsen,
580 F. Supp. 1569, 1572 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
238. Dial-In, Inc. v. ARO Corp., 620 F. Supp. 27, 29 (N.D. Ill.
1985); Armstrong v.
Goldblatt Tool Co., 609 F. Supp. 736, 739 (D. Kan. 1985); see also News-Texan, Inc. v. City of
Garland, 814 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1987)(bad faith not precondition to section 1447(c)
award of just costs); Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685, 687 (10th Cir. 198 1)(award of attorney fees requires bad faith, but award of costs does not).
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costs."'2 39 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit provides an exception to this general rule and will allow attorney fees in the interest
of justice even absent a showing of bad faith.2 °
In those jurisdictions which require a showing of bad faith to recover attorneys fees, proof of negligence, frivolity, improvidence, or
simply a weak or legally inadequate case is insufficient. 24' In Peltierv.
2 4 2 defendant's counsel attempted removal of a divorce action
Peltier,
after he had unsuccessfully attempted the same course of action
before. 243 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted that the
award of attorney's fees for improper removal was not usual and required that the removing party acted "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. "24 The bad faith exception is to be
employed "only in extraordinary circumstances and for dominating
reasons of justice. ' 245 The court interpreted this exception as necessitating that the removing party intentionally instituted the action with
knowledge that it was fictitious and wholly without merit "for the
specific purpose of frustrating and harassing lawfully instituted legal
procedures. ' 24 6 In applying this interpretation to the facts of Peltier,
the court held that the defendant's attorney knew that the removal
was frivolous and in bad faith and attempted the maneuver to delay
and frustrate the jurisdiction of the Family Court. 247 Thus, the imposition of attorneys fees was a proper sanction.
In the Fifth Circuit case of Muirhead v. Bonar,24 s defendant attempted to remove the action, the action was remanded, and the defendant then attempted a second removal on the same theory. 249 The
court denounced the attempted "two bites at the removal apple" and
awarded attorney fees for the second removal.2
In a similar case

239. McLaughlin v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 105 F.R.D. 624, 627 (S.D. Ala. 1985).
240. Grinnell Bros. v. Touche Ross & Co., 655 F.2d 725, 726-27 (6th Cir. 1981); see also
Ray A. Scharer & Co., v. Plabell Rubber Prods., Inc., 858 F.2d 317, 320 (6th Cir. 198 8 )(explaining Grinnell); Zoyoipoulos v. Palombo, 584 F. Supp. 867, 868 n.1 (D. Colo. 1984).
241. Cornwall, 654 F.2d at 687; Schmidt v. National Organization for Women, 562 F.
Supp. 210, 214-15 (N.D. Fla. 1983).
242. 548 F.2d 1083 (ist Cir. 1977).
243. Peltier v. Peltier, 548 F.2d 1083, 1084 (1st Cir. 1977).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 556 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1977).
249. Muirhead v. Bonar, 556 F.2d 735, 736 (5th Cir. 1977).
250. Id. at 737.
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where the defendant filed for a second removal after the first had been
remanded, the court chastised a defendant for wasting judicial time
and resources and called the defendant's action a "poorly disguised
and flagrant misuse of the process and facilities of this United States
District Court" and an "egregious example of abuse." 25 ' The defendant was ordered to pay costs to the plaintiff, the plaintiff's attorney
and the state court.25 2
Not all unsuccessful attempts at removal, however, are met with
section 1447(c) sanctions. In Aynesworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,253

the court acknowledged the factors justifying the award of attorney
fees as listed in Peltier,but added another: attorneys fees are properly
awarded if the removal petition had no substantial basis.254 Even applying this extra factor, however, the Aynesworth court declined to
award fees because it found that defendant had not acted in bad faith
and that the removal petition presented "unique issues of at least ar255
guable merit.

After amendment in November 1988, section 1447(c) now provides
that "[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of just costs
and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result
of the removal.

'26

There is no explicit bad faith requirement and the

specific mention of attorney fees as a proper sanction may induce
some courts to impose such a sanction more often.
Another source of sanctions for improper removal is rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.257 While this rule has always been
251. Mertan v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 581 F. Supp. 751, 753 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
252. Id.
253. 604 F. Supp. 630, 633 (W.D. Tex. 1985)(defendant claimed plaintiff had abandoned
claim against resident defendant); see also supra p. 74.
254. Aynesworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 604 F. Supp. 630, 637-38 (W.D. Tex. 1985).
255. Id. at 638. This appears to be a just result on the facts of Aynesworth. Counsel may
have been confused as to the operation of the voluntary-involuntary rule following Heniford.
Heniford v. American Motors Sales Corp., 471 F. Supp. 328, 338 (D.S.C. 1979)(plaintiff expressly abandoned claim against resident defendant thereafter case held removable).
256. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(c) (West Supp. 1989).
257. Rule 11, in pertinent part, provides:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose address
shall be stated .... The signature of an attorney ... constitutes a certificate by the signer
that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any im-

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University,

41

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 21 [], No. 1, Art. 5

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:59

available to authorize sanctions for improper removal, by the 1988
amendment, the legislature has now made its application to removal
explicit by requiring that the notice of removal must be signed "pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ' 25 8 Rule 11
does not require a showing of bad faith in order to impose sanctions,2 5 9 but it does "stress[ ] the need for some prefiling inquiry into
both the facts and the law. The standard is one of reasonableness
under the circumstances. ' ' 2 ° This objective standard "is more stringent than the original good-faith formula and
thus.., a greater range
261
violation."
its
trigger
will
circumstances
of
Rule 11 also imposes a prohibition against interposing a pleading
for an improper purpose.2 6 2 Violation of either the duty to inquire or
the prohibition against misusing judicial procedures is sufficient to allow the imposition of sanctions.2 63 Indeed, because the rule states
that the court shall impose sanctions for such violations, it has been
held that imposition of sanctions is mandatory. 264 Rule 11 does not,
however, justify sanctions "merely because counsel were incorrect in
their view of the law, particularly in . . . a complex and uncertain
26 5
area."
proper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Prior to amendment in 1983, rule 1I, in pertinent part, stated:
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading;
that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support
it; and that it is not interposed for delay ....
For a willful violation of this rule an
attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
258. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(a) (West Supp. 1989).
259. News-Texan, Inc. v. City of Garland, 814 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1987). Under the
prior language of the rule, the only relevent inquiry was the subjective belief of the attorney at
the time the pleading was signed and sanctions could be imposed only upon a showing of bad
faith. Robinson v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1126 (5th Cir. 1987).
260. Davis v. Veslan Enters., 765 F.2d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 1985)(quoting comments to
1983 amendments to Rule 11); see also News-Texan, Inc., 814 F.2d at 220 (duty of reasonable
inquiry); McLaughlin v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 603 F. Supp. 978, 981 (S.D. Ala. 1985)
(objective standard of reasonable investigation), upon rehearing, 105 F.R.D. 624 (S.D. Ala.
1985).
261. Robinson, 808 F.2d at 1127 (quoting advisory committee note to Rule 11).
262. McLaughlin, 603 F. Supp. at 981.
263. Robinson, 808 F.2d at 1130.
264. Robinson v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1126 (5th Cir. 1987).
265. Vatican Shrimp Co. v. Solis, 820 F.2d 674, 681 (5th Cir. 1987) (attempted removal
of Jones Act case in face of unclear precedent), cert. denied, _ U.S. __, 108 S. Ct. 345, 98 L.

Ed. 2d 371 (1987).
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As sanction provisions, section 1447(c) and rule 11 seem to have
had little effect in deterring attempted removal of obviously nonremovable cases. Certainly they were no deterrent to defendants in
Lamprecht. Both rule 11 and section 1447(c) sanctions were available
at the time of the Lamprecht removal, yet neither was sufficient to
prevent the disruption of the state court trial. As illustrated above,
the defendants' attempted removal was either a willful attempt to mislead the courts or the result of "appalling ignorance. '266 If the former, then attorney fees could properly have been awarded under
section 1447(c) because of the defendants' bad faith. If the latter, the
same statute would have authorized assessment of costs. Applying
section 1447(c) as amended, attorney fees could have been imposed in
either case. Similarly, rule 11 sanctions would have been appropriate
in either case because it appears that the removal petition was interposed for improper purposes. Further, defendants' counsel could not
have made a reasonable inquiry into the law of removal and still have
concluded that the action was properly removable at the time the attempt was made.
It cannot be known if the federal court would have ordered sanctions for defendants' actions because no sanctions were sought. It is
obvious, however, from the very fact of the purported removal, that
the threat of sanctions did not prevent the abuse. This indicates that
the use of sanctions, unless made more prevalent, more publicized and
more painful, is not an effective solution to the problem presented.
D.

CriminalSystem

Another potential solution is to apply elements of removal law for
criminal cases to civil cases. The removal laws afford different treatment of civil and criminal cases the removal laws in at least one important respect-the time for filing the removal petition. Section
1446(c)(1) provides:
[A] petition for removal of a criminal prosecution shall be filed not later
than thirty days after the arraignment in the State court, or at any time
before trial, whichever is earlier, except that for good cause shown the

266. See McLaughlin v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 603 F. Supp. 978, 979-80 (S.D.
Ala. 1985)(willful attempt to mislead or appalling ignorance). Like Lamprecht, defendant in
McLaughlin attempted to remove the action after the jury had been chosen and the state trial
was about to proceed. Id. at 979-80. The federal court found that the removal was not timely
and that it was filed purely for the improper purpose of delaying the trial. Id. at 981.
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United States district court may enter an order granting the petitioner
leave to file the petition at a later time.26 7
The thirty-day time requirement for filing the petition in a civil case
does not include any such limitation.26 8 The petition for removal may
be filed on the eve of trial or, as occurred in Lamprecht, in the middle
of trial.2 69 If the criminal time specification requiring removal before
trial had applied to Lamprecht, then the defendants would have had
no colorable argument that the action was removable at the close of
the plaintiff's case, and the state trial could not have been disrupted.
The defendants would have had to apply to the federal court for a
waiver of the "before trial" provision, and this request would certainly have been denied.
The flaw in this potential solution is that the Lamprecht defendants
had no colorable argument that the action was removable during trial
even under the civil time provision, yet they sought removal and, possibly, would have succeeded in disrupting the state trial. Application
of the criminal requirement of filing before trial would have to be accompanied by more strict application of the time for filing and a conviction by the courts that the time element is jurisdictional. Under
such a plan, untimely removal would be improper and it could not be
accomplished. Defendants would have no incentive to try to disrupt
state trials or force a mistrial with abrupt removals because the tools
would no longer be at their disposal.
Another potential cause for concern with mandating that all removal petitions be filed before trial is that while it might solve the
specific problem addressed in Lamprecht, there are occasions when a
civil case does properly become removable during trial, and defendants in such cases should not be deprived of their right to be heard in

267. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) (1982)(emphasis added). Interestingly, the removal law contained in the Act of 1875, which applied to civil cases, also contained a requirement that the
removal petition be filed before trial. See Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 (pt. 3) Stat. 470,
471. In discussing this provision, the United States Supreme Court stated that a party could
not be allowed to experiment on its case in state court and then, if it met unexpected difficulties, stop the proceedings and take the suit to another tribunal. In re Removal Cases, 100 U.S.
457, 473 (1879). The statute barred the right to remove if the trial had actually begun and was
"in progress in the orderly course of proceeding." Id.
268. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1982)(no language limiting removal to period "before
trial").
269. This is proper, of course, only when the removal during trial occurs within thirty
days of the case having become removable. See id. (thirty-day limitation).
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federal court.2 7 ° This situation is answered by also incorporating the
provision which allows exceptions to be granted by the district court
"for good cause shown" 2 7' and by providing for prompt rulings on
any application for waiver of the "before trial" requirement. 272
The statute providing for removal of criminal cases contains other
interesting provisions which would have alleviated the problem occurring in Lamprecht by removing the desired effect of the late removal-bringing state court proceedings to a halt and, perhaps,
forcing a mistrial. Section 1446(c)(3) states that "[t]he filing of a petition for removal of a criminal prosecution shall not prevent the State
court in which such prosecution is pending from proceeding further,
except that a judgment of conviction shall not be entered unless the
petition is first denied. ' 273 The statute further provides that the district court is to examine the removal petition promptly, and "[i]f it
clearly appears on the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed
thereto that the petition for removal should not be granted, the court
shall make an order for its summary dismissal. ' 274 If the petition is
granted, the state court is notified and only then is it prohibited from
275
proceeding.
The combined effect of these provisions is that removal is not automatic, and until the federal court determines removability, the state
court is not ousted of jurisdiction except for the limited purpose of
entering a judgment adverse to defendant. As applied to Lamprecht,
these provisions certainly would have prevented the disruptive effect
of the defendants' purported removal and would possibly have prevented the attempt at removal itself because the defendants would
have had nothing to gain. Assuming that the petition for removal was
filed at the close of the plaintiff's case, the state court would still have
been free to proceed to verdict. The defendants would have been at

270. The plaintiff may name a resident defendant for the purpose of destroying diversity
and avoiding federal court, and then dismiss that defendant on the eve of or during trial. The
plaintiff should not be allowed to benefit by such manipulation just as defendants should not
benefit by manipulation of removal.
271. Id. § 1446(c)(1).
272. U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) (1982).
273. Id. § 1446(c)(3). The legislature did not amend the civil removal statute to include
this provision. This omission indicates that the legislature approves of the courts' interpretation of the 1948 revision that all state court action is invalid following removal, even when the
case is remanded.
274. Id. § 1446(c)(4).
275. Id. § 1446(c)(5).
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tremendous risk in leaving the courtroom while the trial continued
because the court was well within its continuing jurisdiction until it
received notification by the federal court to halt. As has been discussed previously, the defendants' removal petition was defective in a
variety of ways and certainly the federal court would have denied it
summarily. The only possible disruption to the state proceedings
would have been a potential delay in entering the judgment against
defendant. While this may be of some benefit to defendants in terms
27 6
of the amount of interest accruing between judgment and payment,
most likely it would not be as powerful an incentive as the possibility
of previewing the plaintiff's case, obtaining a mistrial, and getting a
second opportunity to defend the case. Defendants' only real incentive for filing a removal petition under this system would be a desire
to be heard in federal court coupled with a sincere and supportable
belief that removal is proper. Obviously, this is the purpose to which
removal should be put and demonstrates that application of the removal procedure in criminal cases is a workable solution.
E. American Law Institute Proposal
The American Law Institute (hereinafter "ALI") has addressed the
problem of removal during trial and concluded that if the removal is
timely and proper then no problem is presented.2 77 The ALI acknowledged, however, that untimely removal or removal of an unremovable case can be used as a device to force a new trial. 27 1 "Even
an unjustified petition for removal may be used to achieve this result
where the party feels that the state trial has gone badly for him. ' 27 9 It
is unsatisfactory to simply advise the state court to delay further proceedings until the federal court determines the propriety of the removal because a federal judge may not be available or propriety may
be a close question precluding an immediate decision. 280 The ALI
also is concerned that under the present law state courts could lose
jurisdiction before having been given notice, which is the effect if fed-

276. See Davis v. Veslan Enters., 765 F.2d 494, 496 (5th Cir. 1985)(delayed entry of
judgment benefits defendant because interest accrues from entry of judgment).
277. American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and
Federal Courts at 358 (official draft 1969).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 359.
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eral jurisdiction attaches retroactively. 2 8 ' "It is unseemly to have
state courts passing on matters, only to learn later that they had no
282
jurisdiction."
In an effort to resolve these difficulties, the ALI proposed a new
removal law designed to give more protection to the jurisdiction of
the state courts. The proposal specifically states that removal is not
effective until all of the required steps are completed. 2 83 After the
removal is effected, the state court shall proceed no further unless the
action is remanded; however, if removal is effected while a trial is in
progress, the state court may complete the trial and, thereafter, enter
judgment if the case is remanded. 284 This provision is similar in effect
to section 1446(c)(3), as discussed above, because it allows the state
court to proceed while the federal court determines removability, but
the state court may not enter a judgment. Similar to the effect of the
law before 1948, if the removal is valid then the state court loses jurisdiction when the statutory steps are completed, and its verdict is a
nullity. If the removal is improper then the verdict, or any other action by the state court in the interim, is valid. 285 The state court has
the option to complete the trial but is not required to do so. 286 Factors to be considered include: the probability that the removal is
proper, the ability to adjourn trial and resume after remand, 287 and
the promptness with which the federal court is apt to decide the
matter.
Application of this proposal to Lamprecht illustrates its similarity
in effect to the criminal provision discussed above. Had the ALI rule
been in effect, the Lamprecht defendants would have had no incentive
to file a meritless removal petition during trial because such action
would not have served to disrupt or delay the proceedings. The court
would have statutory authority to proceed except that it could not

281. American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and
Federal Courts at 357 (official draft 1969).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 356, 360-61.
284. Id. at 359-60. The ALI proposal also contains a provision allowing removal by only
one defendant in a case where federal jurisdiction is based on diversity. Id. at 359. The object
of this provision is to eliminate the most common ground for removal during trial-dropping
of the resident defendant. Id.
285. American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and
Federal Courts at 357 (official draft 1969).
286. Id.
287. Id.
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enter judgment until remand was procured. Knowing the likelihood
of remand, the defendants would have been forced to remain in the
courtroom and defend the action. Indeed, assuming that the defendants recognized that the removal petition would have failed, they
likely would not have filed the petition at all.
While the ALI proposal would have prevented the specific abuse
which occurred in Lamprecht, it may be too limited in effect. A meritless petition filed during trial would have no effect on the proceedings unless the judge chooses to delay the suit. An equally meritless
petition filed the day before trial, however, would automatically oust
jurisdiction and cause delay until remand. Because of crowded dockets, even a quick review and remand by the federal court could cause
enough delay that the state courtroom would be reassigned to a different case, and the plaintiff would be forced to wait days or weeks for
the next available courtroom. Although this delay would not enable a
defendant to preview the plaintiff's evidence, as is the case in removal
during trial, it would enable defendant to obtain a continuance to further prepare its own defense. In either case, defendant would enjoy
an unfair and undeserved advantage. For this reason, the ALI proposal allowing the state court to proceed only if removal is effected during trial is not sufficient and would allow continued abuse of removal
privileges.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Abuse of removal and the accompanying abuse of the state courts is
a serious and continuing problem. It demonstrates a lack of respect
for the state court judges, a lack of concern over wasted time and
resources of both state and federal courts, and a lack of regard for the
federal legislation which creates the right to remove. Unfortunately, a
sense of ethics and fair play, even when enforced by the threat of sanctions, is not sufficient to ensure proper use of removal. Further intervention by the courts or the legislature is required. The best solution
is a statutory amendment incorporating aspects of the ALI proposal,
the criminal removal law, and pre-1948 law. Removal must be defined as being effected only by completion of all of the statutory steps.
To eliminate confusion and inconsistency, these steps must be strictly
construed and applied. Except for good cause shown, these steps
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must be completed before the trial begins.28 8 To protect the state
court even in cases where removal is effected on the eve of trial rather
than during trial, the court may proceed with the action, in all cases,
except the court may not enter judgment until the case is remanded.
The state court must be provided a copy of the removal petition or
notice in order to exercise its option to proceed or to stay its hand. If
the court proceeds, and the removal is proper, then its actions are
void. If the removal is improper, either because of procedural deficiencies or lack of jurisdiction, then the state court's interim actions
are valid. "Any other course adds to and encourages unnecessary delays and dilatory tactics.

2 89

The risk of failing to participate in the

state proceedings will properly fall on the removing parties. This risk
should encourage filing of only those removal petitions with arguable
merit.
One final recommendation is to eliminate the automatic nature of
removal. Less confusion and disruption would result if the statute
required prompt review and determination by a federal court on
whether the case were properly removable and whether the removal
process had been properly performed. The federal court would exercise limited jurisdiction over the case for the purpose of making this
determination, but it would not have authority to take substantive
action in the case until it entered an order granting the removal. By
the same token, the state court would not be compelled to surrender
jurisdiction until entry of such an order. This provision would clearly
delineate jurisdiction and reduce conflicts between the courts. It
would also eliminate the problem of duplication of efforts and the burdensome expense of litigating in two forums such as occurred under
the old law.
Statutory reform and less leniancy by the courts in cases of meritless removal will resolve many of the problems discussed above. Even
if the removal issue is resolved, however, the same type of problems
will continue to occur in other areas of the law because at the heart of
these problems is a belief that one must win at all costs, no matter
288. Good cause would include voluntary dismissal of resident defendants by plaintiff.
Use of the good cause exception would require an affirmative finding of good cause by the
federal court and an order waiving the "before trial" requirement.
289. Minus v. Grote, 154 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941, no writ); see
also South Carolina v. Moore, 447 F.2d 1067, 1072 (4th Cir. 1971) ("deterrent to the filing of
frivolous removal petitions at the last minute for the purpose of delaying or disrupting judicial
proceedings in a state court").
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how unethical. We can and must make the removal system, and all
legal systems, work to their full potential by ensuring that we only use
the rights and privileges they afford for their intended purposes and
do not distort and abuse them in the name of "strategy."
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